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1THE FOUR HORSEMEN RIDE TOGETHER:
SCORCHED FIELDS OF WAR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
I.
War, Drought, Disease and Death
Drought alone rarely kills large numbers of people. In Sub-Saharan Africa 
since the 1920s, massive droughts have led to massive famine outside 
Ethiopia and Somalia only when superimposed on war. Southern Africa in the 
1980s and today is no exception.
War kills primarily through the interaction of malnutrition, forced 
migration and illnesses which would otherwise not be life extinguishing. 
That of course is also true of the silent emergencies confronting many 
African absolutely poor and destitute households in non-war, non-drought 
contexts, but war and drought reduce access to food; enforce arduous treks 
for safety, food and/or water; reduce access to preventative and simple 
curative health care and to water (pure or otherwise); and cram human 
beings into cramped, unhygienic camps with inadequate shelter.
In Southern Africa, 1991-92 rains (more accurately lack thereof) have 
produced the apocalypse drought and threatened to lead to apocalypse famine 
in 1992-3. But it is worth remembering that the Apocalypse has four 
horsemen: war, disease and famine ride together to support death.
Therefore the massive threats to life - after real, if flawed, domestic and 
substantial, if tardy and insufficient, international response - are in the 
war as well as drought scorched fields of Mozambique and those of Angola, 
most of which are not drought scorched. Threats to life in states which 
have not had sustained war within their territories - with the possible 
exception of Malawi - are relatively low, as are those to transborder 
refugees who are internationally supported and, indeed, most of those 
assisted by host communities.
In Angola and Mozambique the nature of their 1980s wars has been such as to 
maximise the general threat to civilian life. The UNITA strategy in Angola 
sought to starve towns and government forces by preventing cultivation - 
including through the dragon's teeth approach of planting anti-personnel
2mines in fields - in both government controlled and disputed areas. While 
perhaps 40% of the resulting forced migration was to towns, 40% to 
government controlled rural and peri urban areas, 10% to Zaire, Zambia and 
Namibia and at most 10% to UNITA controlled areas, the destruction of food 
production goal was achieved.
Both UNITA and RENAMO in Mozambique targeted transport and health, 
education and water facilities (and personnel). In the latter three cases 
the motivation appears to have been to destroy government credibility and 
support through obliterating the main benefits rural Mozambicans and 
Angolans perceived themselves as having received from independence. In 
most of rural Angola and perhaps a half of rural Mozambique access to 
primary health services and to improved water supplies ceased to exist and 
ability to deliver food to limit malnutrition/avert famine was either 
crippled or destroyed.
In Mozambique field mining was much less prevalent and RENAMO's strategy 
was more directed to producing a climate of terror in which rural life 
became impossible than with halting food production per se, but the results 
in terms of household ability to self-provision, let alone supply urban 
populations, were similar. In terms of enforcing migration they were even 
more effective - up to 7,000,000 people fled (70% to government controlled 
rural and peri urban areas, over 2 0% across frontiers, up to 10% to cities 
and virtually none to RENAMO controlled areas) while another 1,000,000 were 
pauperised in place hiding out among the ruins of their homes and farms.
The food procurement tactics of the insurgent movements also differed in 
degree and in impact on the rural sector familial. RENAMO fed itself 
almost totally by raids (usually murderous) on households in disputed or 
government controlled areas, forced 'donations' in "tribute" areas and de 
facto slave labour colonies in "controlled" zones. The results were 
disastrous for the robbed, taxed or enslaved households' nutrition.
UNITA's basic source of food appears to have been households in zones it 
controlled, most of whom did (judging by the geographic pattern of election 
returns) support it. While the procurement tactics - especially in poor
crop years - almost certainly increased malnutrition, the impact was not in
general, as dire as in the case of RENAMO.
The differences relate in large part to the nature of the insurgencies.
UNITA was a pre-existing political movement with a geographic base in a
3region which (at elite as well as mass level) has historically resented and 
distrusted Luanda. It had objectives of its own from the start and, while 
at times de facto primarily an instrument of South African and/or US 
geopolitical strategy, related to and retained credibility with its core 
constituency (vide the parliamentary election results). RENAMO was created 
by Rhodesian Intelligence and taken over by the South African special 
forces - by their own admission/claims and on the evidence of captured 
records - and has never achieved a coherent class or geographic base, 
enunciated a coherent programme or paid much attention to winning hearts 
and minds.
The costs of war to Mozambique and Angola (as well as to Southern Africa 
more broadly) have been estimated in some detail for UNICEF and UNECA. A 
summary here may be useful to show the sheer horror that has been inflicted 
on the people of these two countries:
a. 1980-1990 excess deaths related to war. Angola 660,000 (453,000 under 
5), Mozambique 1,100,000 (666,000 under 5),;
b. lost Gross Domestic Product (national output) 1980-1990. Angola 
$42,250 million (1990 actual output one-half probable level had there 
been no war), Mozambique $22,800 (1990 actual output 44% of probable 
non-war level);
c. destruction or forced closure of over half the rural health and primary 
education facilities in both countries;
d. reducing half of all Angolans and Mozambicans to the state of forced 
migrants. (See Tables 1 and 2.)
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Weir related excess deaths 1980-1990
Country Under 5 Other Total
Mozambique 6 6 6 ,0 0 0 434,000 1 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0
Angola 453,000 207,000 660,000
Namibia 35,000 22,500 57,500
Zambia 52,500 2,500 55,000
Malawi 27,000 100 27,100
Tanzania 25,000 250 25,250
Z imbabwe - 500 500
Lesotho - 500 500
Swaziland - 250 250
Botswana — 50 50
SADCC 10 1,258,500 667,650 1,926,150
Table 2
Economic Output Losses Due to War
(US$ '000,000)
Loss in 1988 Prices Loss in 1990 Prices
Country 1980-88 1989-90 1980-90 1990 1990 as %
of achvd GDP
Angola 30,000 8,400 42,250 4,500 100
Mozambique 15,000 5,700 22,800 3,200 130
Zimbabwe 8 ,0 0 0 2,500 11,600 1,320 25
Zambia 5,000 700 6,300 330 15
Namibia 2,500 1,800 4,750 1 ,0 0 0 60
Malawi 2,150 1 ,0 0 0 3,500 550 30
Tanzania 1,300 700 2 ,2 0 0 330 7
Botswana 500 250 825 138 7
Lesotho 300 100 440 50 6
Swaziland 200 50 275 22 5
SADCC 10 64,950 2 1 ,2 0 0 94,940 11,440 45
Sources: UNICEF, Signs of Hope, Towards Rehabilitation and Renewed
Development for the Children of Southern Africa (R. H. Green, R. 
Morgan, C. Davids, authors), 1992, Windhoek/New York.
5The first two cost categories are war related; the second two are direct 
results of war, in large part causing the first two. Deaths from combat or 
even massacre and crossfire are a small proportion of the total. Forced 
migration-malnutrition-collapse of health and transport services are the 
fatal nexus with the very young and the old the main 'target' categories. 
Similarly, loss of output flows primarily from inability to produce in 
rural areas interacting with defence expenditure and destruction of fixed 
capital to crowd out human and social as well as fixed investment spending. 
Both government revenue and exports (except for petroleum in Angola and 
prawns in Mozambique) were badly mauled. Angola was somewhat less affected 
because its half off-shore oil enclaves were much larger absolutely and 
relative to the economy than were Mozambique's off-shore prawn fisheries.
These costs do not end or even stop accumulating with peace. The appalling 
275-300 under five mortality rates (clawed back from over 325 in the late 
1980s) will not be reversed until health services are restored and the road 
to the 100 to 150 once reasonably projectable for the early 1990s on 1975- 
80 trends will now be a long one - Mozambique has set a 1998 target of 150. 
To wipe out the past GDP loss in a decade would require quite implausible 
growth rates - even to prevent its rising will require 8% to 10% annual 
growth (to achieve 4% to 5% on what would have been the non-war base).
Nor can the forced migrants simply return home and resume life where it was 
before the war interrupted it. That is not simply a matter of human and 
social loss and trauma or of lost years. For the overwhelming rural 
majority of forced migrants their fields are grown up to bush; their homes 
collapsed even if not burnt; their access to health-water-education and 
transport weak to negligible; their ability to participate in markets 
blocked by collapse of rural commercial networks; their civil societies at 
best wounded with fractured limbs; their local governance shattered by war 
and consequent lack of finance and by the way donors have chosen to 
programme survival support.
This sketch suggests that the core destitution, famine, disease and death 
problems of Angola and Mozambique are the result of war and at human level 
confront primarily refugees.
That proposition may appear both surprising and inconsistent with the way 
in which Mozambique focuses its "national reconstruction", "livelihood 
rehabilitation" and "absolute poverty reduction" strategic initiatives.
6However - especially in rspect to rural areas - this is in large part a 
semantic confusion arising from the narrow interpretation frequently put on 
the term refugee.
Who Are Refugees/Forced Migrants?
There is a fairly precise international law definition of refugee turning 
on crossing an international frontier. Only fairly precise because:
a. war and post war situations may leave frontiers in flux, e.g.. Eritrea 
is clearly about to regain its independence so ex-residents currently 
in Ethiopia while not now legally refugees are arguably likely to 
become so in 1993. Similarly, it would be rash to predict that Somalia 
will be reborn as a single state which has implications for the status 
of those who have fled to - e.g. - the Northwest (ex, and perhaps to 
be, Somaliland). However this particular issue is not relevant in 
Southern Africa and (with the conceivable but unlikely exception of 
Cabinda) is unlikely to become so;
b. persons fleeing across borders for 'economic' reasons (including 
fleeing death by starvation or dehydration) are not refugees for 
international law purposes. In Southern Africa mixed cases of fleeing 
insecurity and starvation have in practice been considered to be 
refugees. 1992 has posed the issue more acutely - almost all 1992 
transborder migrants from Mozambique have been fleeing 
starvation/dehydration. However, among them are two significant sub­
groups, RENAMO combatants' households and ex-RENAMO controlled civilian 
households whose flight was in one case caused and in the other made 
possible by drought but does have a significant political element;
c. international refugee law and UNHCR procedure, at least implicitly, 
assume refugees to be fleeing from their home state government's 
oppression not from its inability to protect them from insurgency.
This may make a limited difference while they remain in exile (clashes 
between insurgent and other refugees have not been unknown in Southern 
Africa but nor have they been frequent or high profile).
It does have major implications in terms of post-return support. 
Separate programmes and monitoring for signs of oppressive state action 
make good sense if refugees from a government are returning while it or
7a lineal successor is in power. However, in Mozambique at least they 
are logically inappropriate because the international refugees fled not 
from the government but from its inability to protect them and because 
counterproductive they comprise a minority of forced migrants 
distinguishable from the minority who did not cross frontiers only in 
having on balance enjoyed rather more food and distinctly less 
insecurity and in - sometimes - being in more need of long distance 
transport home not in what support they need to enable them to restore 
their livelihoods. Setting up one enabling programme for all returnees 
will be hard enough; seeking to have two or more parallel ones is close 
to madness given institutional, personnel and resource constraints.
International refugee law is useful. Protection and international support 
for transfrontier forced migrants is important. It does have unique 
aspects resulting from the host government neither being the government of 
citizenship nor of probable final residence and - in the African context — 
usually being both unwilling and unable to divert substantial resources 
from its own citizens to meet refugee needs. However, to view Southern 
Africa forced migration and - a fortiori - post war national reconstruction 
and livelihood rehabilitation solely (or even primarily) through the 
international refugee law prism is to confuse a grove or copse with the 
entire, larger wood.
In Mozambique and Angola slightly over half the total population have been 
afflicted with forced migration since 1980 (see Table 3). Of this, 
international forced migration (refugees) comprise perhaps a fifth in the 
case of Mozambique and a tenth in that of Angola. The main categories are:
1 . international refugees;
2 . domestic refugees (deslocados) in camps with at least minimal emergency 
programme assistance;
3 . rural and peri urban located displaced persons not in camps but not 
perceived as satisfactorily resettled in terms of livelihood 
rehabilitation (affectados). The probably permanent population shift 
into the rural portions of the Beira Corridor is taken account of in 
the Mozambique figure. These households may or may not have more bits 
of livelihood than deslocados; most unambiguously receive much less (a
8majority none at all) emergency support through government or external 
NGO channels;
4. urban residents who are forced migrants because of war not economic
drift. These households fall outside the scope of emergency programme
assistance. This group is much larger in Angola partly because of a 
different war pattern and, probably, partly because of narrower urban 
area definition in Mozambique;
5. rural households pauperised in place who live in or near their home
areas but under conditions of insecurity and destitution precluding
their rehabilitating their livelihoods or lives. Like affectados they 
receive very patchy and limited assistance.
Arguably the last category are not migrants. Certainly that is literally 
true. However, in seeking to design rural reconstruction strategies to 
enable households to rehabilitate lives and livelihoods their requirements 
diverge only in respect to not needing transport home.
On the other hand, an arguable addition are demobilised ex-combatants from 
rural areas - and their immediate families. These may number 275,000 
persons in Mozambique (if the latest estimates of 10,000 RENAMO and 75,000 
government combatants less a 30,000 new armed forces are correct) and
500,000 in Angola (including personnel who demobilised themselves pre­
empting or deserting from the official process). Since the rural 
combatants were largely conscripted or kidnapped (RENAMO's main recruiting 
method) and, in general, their immediate families receive negligible 
support they are forced migration afflicted even during and especially 
after the war.
Mozambique has viewed reconstruction as encompassing refugees, deslocados, 
affectados, demobilisados and those pauperised in place. The 
distinguishing characteristics are having been directly afflicted by war, 
being destitute or absolutely poor and requiring state supporting action to 
rehabilitate their livelihoods. Therefore it is distinctly unenthusiastic 
about separate programmes for refugees (after return to home districts) or, 
indeed, for rural demobilisados.
9Table 3
Forced Migrants - Mozambique, Angola 1991/92
Mozambique Angola1
International Refugees 1,500,000= 500,000
Internal Refugees'1 1,800,000 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
Internal Displaced Persons5 3,000,000= 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
Urban War Flight5 500,000 1,500,000
Pauperised In Place7 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 (750,000
Total 7,800,000 4,750,000
Probable Population Including 
International Refugees® 14,000,000 9,300,000
% Forced Migrants 56 (52 ) 9 52
% International Refugees 11 3
Notes:
1. Most Angolan figures are much more guesstimates than the Mozambican 
estimates.
2. Malawi (nominally 1,000,000), Tanzania (100,000), Zambia (75,000), 
Zimbabwe (150,000), Swaziland (50,000), South Africa (150,000-250,000). 
Includes estimated non-officially registered, probably does not cover 
short term 1992 drought refugees.
3. Countries of residence - Zaire (over 150,000), Zambia (over 250,000), 
Namibia (25,000), Congo (?), Botswana (?), South Africa (?). A 
majority are not registered and the estimates for particular countries 
have been remarkably volatile, partly depending on shifts in main war 
zone locations.
4. Deslocados registered in camps.
5. Registered and unregistered affectados displaced and not satisfactorily
resettled but not in camps.
6 . In Mozambique it is arguable that the urban population of 3,000,000 
(22%) is not greatly above probable non-war levels. Nor is Maputo's
10% of total population abnormally high for a middle sized country with
a dominant city. Greater Luanda (perhaps defined more broadly than 
Maputo) is estimated at having 20% of total population and urban areas 
up to 40% which does suggest a much larger urban affectado population 
likely to return/wish to return to rural livelihoods if available.
7. Hiding or camping in or near ruins of homes in areas which are both war
devastated and insecure. Angola figure virtually a pure guess or 
analogue to the Mozambican estimate. The Angolan simply subtracts the 
1980-1991 excess death toll (projecting the UNICEF 1960-1990 estimate) 
from 1 0 .0  million.
8 . The official 1991 projections of 15.7 and 10 million are obvious 
overestimates since no account is taken of excess deaths as a result of 
war. The Mozambican figure used here is based on very rough estimates 
of 12.5 million in Mozambique and 1.5 million in exile as of late 1991.
9. (52) excludes the urban war flight category. Mozambique's 'zero base' 
assumption is that virtually 100% of other categories will seek to 
return to rural home area livelihoods but virtually 0% of those 
residing in urban areas. Because of the different migration patterns 
in Angola the latter assumption would seem implausible there.
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II.
Drought Rides In: Responses and Reflections
For the forced migrants of southern and central Mozambique and of southern 
Angola 1992-93's food crisis flowing from the superimposition of the 
1990/91 drought on the pre-existing food shortage resulting from war waged 
by rural terrorism by both insurgencies.
The starting point is the underlying pre-drought food position as of 1990- 
91. This is better estimated for Mozambique (Table 4A) than for Angola.
Of a basic requirement of 4,500,000 tonnes, about 1,125,000 (25%) was not 
met with domestic production providing 2,750,000 (of which 2,250,000 
household self-provisioning) and imports 625,000 (of which 500,000 food aid 
and 125,000 commercial with about 175,000 tonnes reaching forced migrants 
and 450,000 tonnes sold to urban and less affected rural residents). The 
rural position is even worse with a gap between supply and basic average 
requirements of 29% - a borderline famine level pre-drought.
The Angolan position was probably basically similar at national level or 
perhaps slightly worse. However, food aid has been massively lower and 
commercial imports substantially higher. Further, the urban affectado 
population is very much larger. Therefore, the 29% vs 12% urban vs rural 
food supply gap differential characterising Mozambique was much narrower in 
Angola, perhaps 28%-20%. However, the concentration of the shortfall on 
forced migrants was the same.
The 1991/92 rain failure and 1992/93 famine threat did not affect Angola in 
the same way as Mozambique. In the south there was a drought and is a real 
famine danger which may also apply to parts of the west. Elsewhere rains 
were normal and food production modestly higher because of that and the 
less insecure conditions pertaining in rural Angola in 1991 and - at least 
until October - 1992. However, the changes were by no means enough - even 
outside the drought stricken zone - to end the continuing emergency.
Five of Mozambique's provinces suffered devastating crop losses (up to 100% 
of non-tree crops in some districts), while another two were partially 
affected. The output loss can be estimated (Table 4B) as of the order of 
1,000,000 tonnes. To the extent food aid does not rise, this would imply a 
50% shortfall on food supply - famine by any criterion.
Table 4A
'Normal' Food 'Balance' Position 
(tonnes grain equivalent)
Basic Requirement1 4,500,000 (100%)
Domestic Production 2,750,000 (62%)
Urban (Zonas Verdes) 150,000 (3%)
Household Consumed (50,000) (1%)
Commercialised (1 0 0,0 0 0) (2%)
Rural 2,600,000 (59%)
Household Consumed (2 ,2 0 0,0 0 0) (48%)
Commercialised - 
Formal and Informal (500,000) (11%)
Imports 625,0002 (13%)
Food Aid (500,000) (11%)
Commercial/Parallel (125,000) (2%)
Food Deficit 1.125,000 (25%)
Urban/Rural Breakdown
Basic Requirement3
Domestic Production 
Urban 
Rural
Household Consumed 
Commercialised
Imports2
Food Deficit
Urban
1,080,000
Rural
4,420,000
550.000 2,200,000
(150.000) ( - )
(400.000)
( 50,000) (2,100,000)
(500.000) (100,000)
400.000 225,000
(130.000) (12%) 995,000 (29%)'
Based on 12,500,000 population estimate.
Probably understates total imports. May be 125,000 tonnes additional 
border imports from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi consumed 
in adjoining rural districts or nearby towns. Transborder exports to 
Malawi and Tanzania - not estimated - may be up to 50,000 tonnes.
These are from areas - e.g. Angonia, Northern Mueda Plateau with poor 
transport links with the rest of Mozambique.
Based on 3,000,000 urban and 9,500,000 rural
Intuitively 29% - borderline famine level - appears slightly too high 
(61% of basic nutritional need average availability too low). 125,000 
tonnes of underestimated border area imports consumed in rural areas or 
reducing the actual Mozambican sources sales to towns would lower it to 
the 26% level which seems plausible.
Table 4B
1991-92 Drought Losses/1992-93 Added Aid Requirements
a. Low Estimate
Urban Production1 40,000
Household Consumed 10,000 (20%)
Commercialised 30,000 (40%)
Rural Production1 725,000
Household Consumed 525,000 (25%)
Commercialised 200,000 (40%)
Total Output Loss 765,000
High Estimate
Urban Production1 
Household Consumed 
Commercialised
12,500 (25%) 
40,000 (40%)
52,500
Rural Production1 
Household Consumed 
Commercialised 
Total Output Loss
630.000 (30%)
325.000 (65%)
955,000
1,007,500
Notes
1 Division between household consumed and commercialised
speculative. In some districts there will be small surpluses; in 
Zonas Verdes commercialised vegetables are more attractive than 
self-consumed grain; even in deficit zones non-food basic needs 
(e.g. clothes, fuel and light, medical fees) will lead to some 
food crop sales.
13
The 1991-93 drought/famine crisis in Southern Africa is a case study of the 
problems of emergency assistance not because it was not warned of early, 
nor because response was unusually tardy or meagre nor because of unique 
logistical problems or lack of recipient/donor experience with the area.
Au contraire, on all except logistical problems in Angola and Mozambique, 
the case is one of earlier than average announcement, less inadequate than 
usual donor response and greater than average national (and regional) 
calamity coping institutional capacity. It is precisely this situation 
which makes it a useful test of the weakness of calamity/catastrophe 
response and of means to improve future performance.
The early warning system in Southern Africa warned - amber lights were on 
by November 1991, red by January 1992 and flashing red with sirens by 
March. The early estimates (Table 5A) were largely confirmed by FAO/WFP 
Mission brought forward to April (Table 5B) in response to national, 
regional and individual/NGO highlighting of the crisis which UNDP, FAO and 
WFP were handling in a dangerously low key up to March.
Of the import and fiscal requirements (Table 5C) taken to the June UN-SADCC 
(Southern African Development Coordination Conference - now Southern 
African Development Community) sponsored pledging conference, about 60% of 
food requirements were pledged - and about 80% of emergency (free delivery) 
food targets. However, the response in respect to water (10%) and to 
agriculture (still lower) was much poorer. The first suggests a failure to 
realise that lack of water - even more than of food - drove 1992 forced 
migration and the second a near total failure to package livelihood 
rehabilitation together with survival.
Mozambique as of October had pledges of about 740,000 tonnes of 1,360,000 
needed - 54%. In part this related to doubts about capacity to deliver. 
These were in large part circular. Reduction of logistical support to 
Mozambican institutions and a failure to realise that providing far less 
food than the minimum need of severely malnourished people (including the 
desperately underpaid storers, transporters, distributors and guards of the 
foodl) maximised "leakage", were among the main causes of the capacity 
limitations.
Table 5A 
Summary Regional Data
(February Projection)
Additional
Drought Deficit1 
(tonnes)
Loss of Regional 
Sources1 
(tonnes)
Additional Extra 
Regional Import Need 
(tonnes)
Entitlement Loosers9 
(persons)
Basic Food 
Aid Need13 
(tonnes)
South Africa 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 - 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 4,000,000-7,000,00010 800,000-1,400,OOO19
Zimbabwe 1,250,000-2,000,0002 - 1,250,000-2,000,000 4,000,000-5,000,000 750,000
Mozambique 875,0003 150,000a 1,025,000 4,500,00011 875,0003
Malawi 400,000 - 400,000 3,000,000 400,000
Zambia 500,000-750,0004 100,000-150,000 600,000-900,000 2,000,000-3,000,0004 500,000
Tanzania 250,000-500,000s - 250,000-500,000 500,000-2,000,0005 250,000-500,000
Lesotho 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 - 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 250,000 1 0 0 ,0 0 0
Swaziland 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 50,000 150,000 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 75,000-100,000
Botswana 100,000-150,000 25,000-100,000 125,000-250,000 300,000 50,000
Namibia 50,000 50,000-100,000 100,000-150,000 15,000-50,00012 25,000
Angola 100,000-150,000s - 100,000-150,000 1, 500,000s 200,000-250,00015
Total 9,725,000 375,000 1 0,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 20,165,000 4,025,000
11,175,000 550,000 11,725,000 26,700,000 4,950,000
1991/92
Base - - 1,600,000 - 950,000
From: R. H. Green, 'Sound The Tocsin: The Third Horseman Mounts To Ride'
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Notes
Table derived from text based on mosaic of WFP, UNICEF, SADCC, National 
Government and press reports.
1. Additional imports required for pre drought importers and total imports 
required for pre drought exporters. Tonnages are grain equivalent of 
estimated national food deficits caused by drought.
2. See text. 1,250,000 appears more likely.
3. Midpoint of range. See Annex.
4. Uncertainty as to Western Zambia affects estimate.
5. Possible late rain impact significant.
6 . Very tentative. Assumes limited drought losses outside Southeast 
quadrant.
7. Previous South African or Zimbabwe sourced imports unlikely to be 
available in 1992-93.
8 . Includes 75,000-100,000 triangular food aid from Zimbabwe; 50,000-
75,000 parallel market imports from South Africa and Zimbabwe.
9. Loss of household self provisioning food, agricultural cash sales, 
agricultural cash ('casual' or wage) employment plus loss of wage and 
self employment income from commercial and other urban sectors affected 
by drought damage to rural purchasing power. Estimate is of households 
whose entitlements are severely reduced and pushed well below absolute 
poverty line. Largely excludes second round effects of higher food 
prices.
10. Rural component 2,000,000-3,000,000; dorp (small town) 750,000- 
1,250,000; urban and peri-urban 1,250,000-2,750,000. Last figure 
highly approximate because urban drift and general economic stagnation 
trend effects almost impossible to separate fully from drought impact.
11. Includes affectados (war displaced persons not receiving food relief) 
and other severely war affected rural sector familial households whose 
limited output will be severely drought damaged as well as more stable 
sector familial farming households and commercial agriculture employee 
households.
12. Caprivian farming households plus commercial farm/ranch and related 
commercial sector employees and households only.
13. Excludes import requirement other than for human consumption and - 
where plausible - financeable additional commercial imports.
14. Capacity constraint problem severe given unsuitability of Government 
channels. See text.
15. Higher than strict drought relief estimate because Angola has in the 
past received disproportionately low food aid and because additional 
flows to a UNITA controlled area without parallel expansion of flows 
through Government channels would appear politically impracticable (as 
well as undesirable).
Table 5B
FAQ/WFP MXSSTON ESTIMATES 
(April Assessment)
Grain Production Import Requirements51 Food Aid Requirements Commercial Imports
(tonnes) (tonnes) (tonnes) (tonnes)
Of Which
1987/1991 Aug.1 1992 % Normal Grain Other** Grain7 Other Emergency® Grain10 Other**
Southern Africa 
Zimbabwe 2,335,000 608,000 26 1,410,000 ( 75,000) 660,000 38,200 509,000 750,000 ( 36,800)
Mozambique 550,000* 226,000 41 1,381,000 (150,000) 1,303,000 101,000 688,000 78,000 ( 49,000)
Malawi 1,485,000 683,000 46 376,000 ( 75,000) 740,000 38,000 438,000 136,000 ( 37,000)
Zambia 1,600,000 572,000 36 970,000 ( 30,000) 820,000 15,000 109,000’ 150,000 ( 15,000)
Tanzania 3,825,000 3,,250,000 85 500,000 ( 10,000) 280,000 1,500 16,000’ 220,000 ( 8,500)
Lesotho 172,500 01,000 47 297,000 ( 20,000) 75,000 3,000 78,000 222,000 ( 17,000)
Swaziland 140,000 53,000 38 129,000 ( 15,000) 60,000 5,500 47,000 69,000 ( 9,500)
Botswana 59,000 15,000 24 240,000 ( 50,000) 15,000 1,700 17,000’ 225,000 ( 48,300)
Namibia 110,000 33,000 30 125,000 ( 35,000) 60,000 1,350 61,000 65,000 ( 33,650)
Angola 317,000* 454,000 143 285,000* ( 70,000) 125,000* 20,000 136,000 160,000 { 50,000)
(Sub Total) 10,600,000* 5,,975,000 56* 6,213,000 (530,000) 4,138,000 225,000 1,967,000 2,075,000 (305,000)
South Africa 12,150,000 3,650,000 30 5,500,000 ~ - “ " **
Total 22,750,000* 9,625,000 42a 11,713,000 (530,000) 4,138,000 225,000 1,967,000 2,075,000 (305,000)
Source: Adapted from FAO/WFP March-April 1992, Mission To Southern Africa.
Notes:
1. In general 1986/87, 1987/88 and 1988/89 were good crop years with 1989/90 and 1990/91 poor. However, there has been substantial inter and intra 
country divergence within this trend. Country figures computed from Mission 1992 crop and % of normal data.
2. War has both depressed output and hampered estimation of volume grown. Total production estimates appear to be too low but changes may be less so.
3. Sum total of country data from, or computed from. Mission Report. Mission implicit regional total crop figures are higher and, therefore, % of
normal presented in report is lower than the total of their country data.
4. Implausibly low. Angola's recent past crop levels like Mozambiques have been war (and insurgent tactics) devastated. Institutional and transport
barriers - as well as financial - have limited past emergency assistance distribution to very low levels and imposed severe hunger constraints on 
isolated inland cities and towns. With the relaxation of the war, transport and to a degree institutional constraints the needed (for minimally 
adequate nutrition) imports required are probably on the order of 450,000 to 500,000 tonnes of food aid 275,000 to 350,000 tonnes and of emergency 
programme distribution 125,000 to 175,000 tonnes.
5. Net national territorial requirement (including resident refugees) excluding imports to replace regional exports (South Africa) and transit traffic 
to landlocked states (Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa).
6. Rough estimate. Only direct emergency food aid requirement directly available from Mission Report.
7. In principle includes all amounts already pledged. In practice appears to exclude wheat imports which are de facto aid financed in Tanzania, Zambia
Zimbabwe totalling perhaps 250,000 tonnes and up to 25,000 tonnes similarly financed rice imports in Tanzania.
8. For free ration, food for work, work for food and/or special project distribution. Includes grain and other.
9. Implausibly low. At least in cases of Tanzania and Botswana appears to exclude nationally organised free food ration distribution to severely
drought (or flood) affected districts. Given the number of displaced persons in Angola a more plausible estimate would be of the order of 150,000 
tonnes.
10. By subtraction Food Aid Requirement from Import Requirement. Inadequate estimates of local cross border imports and exports except for Zambia to
Zaire.
Table 5C
IMPORT AIS1P FISCAL REQUIREMENTS 1 1992/1993' ; FOOD 7\ND DROUGHT
(Tonnes / $)x
Imports
FOOD'*
(tonnes)
Food Aid*
OTHER REQUIREMENTS AND SOURCES3
Grain Other
Staple
Emergency3 Other Pledged*
Pre-Drought
Gap* Transport/
Distribution"7
Water/Camps/ 
Work Programmes0
Pledged
Pre-Drought
Additional
Monetisation9
Gap10
Zimbabwe11 1,410,000 75,000 509,000 300,000 75,000 734,000 60,000,000 60,000,000 5,000,000 15,000,000 100,000,000
Mozambique 1,381,000 150,000 688,000 615,000 600,000 703,000 100,000,000 60,000,000 30,000,000 5,000,000 125,000,000
Malawi 376,000 75,000 438,000 337,000 350,000 425,000 60,000,000 20,000,000 20,000,000 10,000,000 50,000,000
Zambia12 970,000 30,000 209,000 670,000 100,000 779,000 40,000,000 20,000,000 5,000,000 20,000,000 35,000,000
Tanzania12 500,000 10,000 116,000 300,000 50,000 366,000 25,000,000 15,000,000 5,000,000 7,500,000 27,500,000
Lesotho 297,000 20,000 78,000 100,000 30,000 148,000 7,500,000 10,000,000 7,500,000 2,500,000 7,500,000
Swaziland 129,000 15,000 47,000 19,000 5,000 61,000 3,000,000 2,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 4,000,000
Botswana3 3 240,000 50,000 17,000 - 2,000 15,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 negl. negl. 4,000,000
Namibia 125,000 35,000 61,000 39,000 15,000 85,000 7,000,000 8,000,000 2,500,000 500,000 12,000,000
Angola1* 500,000 70,000 150,000 50,000 50,000 250,000 35,000,000 35,000,000 5,000,000 8,000,000 57,000,000
Total
Southern Africa 6,428,000 530,000 2,313,000 2 530,000 1,277,000 3 ,566,000 339,500,000 232,500,000 81,000,000 54,000,000 437,000,000
Sources; FAO/WFP Mission Report, "Tucsin", National Data
Notes:
1. Totals include baseline (pre-drought) and drought requirements.
2. Adjusted from Mission data for Angola and by Inclusion of Other Staple Food (beans, legumes, vegetable, oil, sugar) in Imports as well as Emergency Food
Aid Totals.
3. Adjusted to include estimates of all national free and food for work/work for food programming, except in the case of Botswana where part will be covered 
by commercial imports.
4. Includes food financed from general balance of payments support and concessional loan arrangements (especially for wheat and, secondarily rice)
apparently excluded in Report. Adjusted upward in cases in which commercial import residual in Report’s Table 1 (Table 2 above) appears unattainably
high.
5. Rough estimate - broadly similar to 1990/91 deliveries.
6. Stated in tonnes because donor accounting prices for food and transport tend to be on average 25% to 50% above commercial import parity.
7. Average of $100 tonne for emergency and $25 tonne for non-emergency (basically monetised) food aid. Substantially higher in Mozambique and Angola.
8. Rough estimates because water shortage alleviation costs are not fully articulated and importance of drought displaced person camps (i.e. inability to
meet food and water needs in home area), food for work/work for food and water supply security enhancing needs vary sharply by country.
9. Calculated on non-emergency portion of gap (assuming pre-drought pledged aid counterpart elements have already been allocated). Rough estimate of $50
per tonne on account of built in 180 day lag in most states because credit ceilings prevent wholesaler using overdraft increase to buy on a cash basis.
Given collection experience (lags and leakages) this may an overestimate.
10. Fiscal gap arising from enhanced drought impact mitigation programme.
11. Zimbabwe's national 2,200,000 import requirement estimate covers 18 months with, of the order of 150,000 tonnes prior to and some 450,000 outside the 
1992/93 period. The remaining apparent 200,000 tonne divergence seems to relate to divergence on minimum acceptable stocks to cover the time to a
delayed harvest (or the time to mobilise aid) in drought disaster years. Increased aid estimate because Zimbabwe's external account and fiscal position
are far too fragile to carry projected level of commercial imports and domestic financing.
12. Emergency requirement adjusted upward (within unchanged total). Mission figures below minimum Zambian rural relief requirements and 'normal'
Tanzanian drought year District ration distribution levels.
13. Emergency figure may be correct in terms of external assistance sought. However, in that case it would seem that 50% or more of food will be provided
by government out of commercial imports and general budget revenues. In the Botswana case this is perfectly practicable.
14. Import, aid, emergency figures all adjusted upward. Conclusion of war and some reallocation of personnel plus transport make much larger rural food 
distribution possible. Inability to deliver not lack of need has explained very low Angola imports relative to Mozambique.
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Angola on the face of it fared better with 78% pledged; but 65,000 of
84,000 tonnes. This is a farcically low estimate given Angola's limited 
commercial import capacity. It appears to result from under-recognition of 
the pre-drought food crisis on the part of FAO/WFP and Angola's belief - on 
past experience - it could not secure truly large international food aid 
commitments no matter how energetically it produced and presented a case, 
and so gave far less priority to doing so than did Mozambique. Further, 
the drought focus of the Mission did disadvantage Angola because its rural 
food deficit/forced migration crisis was, admittedly, not the result of 
1991/92 rain failure - indeed had been slightly alleviated by rain and 
security improvement and there was an implicit baseline assumption that 
1991 levels of output-imports-aid were - if not adequate - at least 
acceptable.
However, as of October the most serious threat of famine turned on 
delivery. Even 1992/93 eating year (or harvest year) pledges made before 
June had in large part not arrived and to a not insignificant extent had
not even been scheduled. Overall about 10% of total food aid needs had
actually been landed. The impact is disproportionately high for countries 
with poor transport, low commercial import capacity and severe fiscal 
constraints. Mozambique fares disastrously on each count and Angola only 
somewhat better on the second and third and perhaps worse on the first. 
Further, in the run up to the long rains (whose immediate effect is to 
worsen delivery and distribution problems), the security situation in 
Angola has taken a sharp turn for the worse.
The argument that neither Mozambique nor Angola - with exceptions in the 
most isolated rural areas and some formerly Renamo controlled enclaves - 
resembles Somalia or, indeed, much of the central and southern Sudan in 
picture of famine dying and dead is accurate so far as it goes. It is to 
the credit of Angolans and Mozambicans (including the governments) that 
this is the case. But to use this fact to argue that there is no real 
crisis or no urgent necessity for more support is not merely obscene but 
quite false. The reasons for the difference are quite different:
1. in both Mozambique and Angola there are functioning governments with a
substantial degree of international and domestic legitimacy - a
condition not existing in Somalia;
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2 . civil governance - however debilitated - does exist not only in cities 
but in respect to refugee camps and to the rural areas in which most of 
the forced migrants and sector familial live (90% in Mozambique even 
before the General Accord) which cannot be said of central and southern 
Somalia nor (with the possible exception of a few towns) of central and 
southern Sudan;
3. the governments of Mozambique and Angola have given - respectively - 
very high and relatively high priority to emergency assistance to 
prevent the death or total pauperisation of forced migrant people even 
if their capacity to do so is very much less than adequate. That is 
certainly not the case with the government of the Sudan nor with the 
central and south Somalian war-lords masquerading as governments;
4. however debilitated and fragmentary, both Angola and Mozambique possess 
functioning calamity and catastrophe coping institutions with some 
ability to collect and access data, posit needs, mobilise resources and 
distribute survival assistance either directly or via donors and both 
external and domestic NGOs;
5. with the partial exception of RENAMO no major actor in Angola or 
Mozambique has taken the position that it was willing to use the 
starvation of the civilian population under its enemy's control as a 
tactic to win its war and certainly not that it preferred to starve its 
own civilians rather than allow food aid to civilians under hostile 
control (because of the inevitable leakage to combatants). That is the 
reverse of the Sudanese governmental and insurgency stance and of that 
of at least some Somali war-lords;
6 . as a result the 1992-93 impending famine was documented earlier, put to 
the international community sooner and channels (including on the 
ground institutional capacity) for response existed.
To argue this is not to oppose humanitarian assistance to the people of the 
Sudan and Somalia nor to argue against cooperation with whatever civil 
governance units showing interest in their people's survival exist. Far 
from it. It is to condemn the view that "things aren't so bad" in Angola 
and Mozambique and to assert that more, more sensitive support is 
unnecessary. Lives have been saved because of the joint actions of 
Angolans and Mozambicans, their governments and the international
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community. To reduce that support now (or rather to continue falling short 
of the conservative targets set by FAO/WFP and the inadequate pledges made 
in June) will hurl almost saved lives back into the graves from which they 
were being rescued.
The 'lessons' derivable from reflection on the 1991-1993 drought/famine 
'exercise' in Southern Africa are not solely related to forced migrants. 
They apply to the general problems confronting emergency assistance whose 
practitioners (domestic and, especially, international) have been slow to 
learn from the experience of the past sixty years.
The means to mitigating the short run human costs of natural calamities and 
man-made (women are rarely among the main authors even though they are over 
25% of the victims and children over 50%) catastrophes and of achieving 
national reconstruction enabling household livelihood rehabilitation are 
basically domestic and international political economic. However - perhaps 
fortunately in terms of making a start toward positive change - they 
interact with a series of more technical failings.
The political economic focus actually serves rather well to propose 
technical changes since many technical weaknesses are, at the least, 
intertwined with broader conceptual issues:
1 . calamities (natural disasters) should be perceived as recurrent, not 
one-off, events both globally and nationally;
2 . therefore, both at donor and (even more crucial) national level, 
permanent institutional structures able to expand to large scale 
activity within two to four months are needed;
3. allowing forward planning of useful work for food based small scale 
infrastructure schemes both to enable calamity stricken households to 
sustain self-respect and self-reliance and to add some material output 
to the overriding survival priority;
4. planning calamity offsetting programmes in a way conducive to 
sustaining rural transport and market mechanisms, e.g. paying cash to 
buy food and - if food transport under Calamity Commission auspices is 
necessary - contracting out haulage to domestic enterprises in ways 
encouraging back haul of whatever the rural area has to sell;
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5. accepting the imperative of a single, nationally-led coordinating 
institution (and of enough harmonisation of donor procedures to allow 
both coordination and transparency) while avoiding creating external 
enclaves and parallel systems or using technical assistance to co-opt 
previously national mechanisms;
6 . recognising that after most calamities (single year droughts with 
limited livestock losses are often exceptions) livelihood 
rehabilitation (replacement of working capital in seeds, tools, 
livestock and repair of fixed capital in land clearing and homes) is 
virtually always needed and that after catastrophes (human caused 
disasters - basically war) broader infrastructure, human and social 
investment services and market network reconstruction are likely to be 
needed;
7. and, therefore, linking the emergency survival and livelihood 
rehabilitation phases of calamity/catastrophe alleviation and reversal;
8 . implying both a longer time horizon and one related to contextual 
reality not dogma or rules of thumb;
9 . plus a recognition that avoiding the need to move away from home 
(achievable in most droughts albeit not in wars) greatly reduces the 
cost and time required for rehabilitation so that early response to 
warnings of impending disaster is crucial;
1 0 . and that future vulnerability reduction elements (e.g. drought 
resistant seed, rehabilitation/augmentation of water supplies, 
veterinary as well as human basic drug reserves, basic national inter­
year food reserves adequate to ride out the lag before commercial or 
aid import flows arrive in crisis years) are part of 
Emergency/Rehabilitation operations;
1 1. paralleled by a less paternalistic perception of calamity/catastrophe 
afflicted households (and countries) based on a treble realisation that 
they usually know their own circumstances better than outsiders, have 
developed substantial (if fragile and subject to overloading) 
capacities to cope and - however generous external (whether to 
household or to country) support - bear the main financial, social and 
burdens of the calamity/catastrophe and of the ways in which it is
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faced (or fudged). (International "boredom" and "fatigue" over 
Mozambique1s decade-long emergency are real enough but the very terms 
are rather obscene when set against the anguish of the 7,000,000 
afflicted Mozambicans who are alive, let alone the fate of over a 
million and a quarter of their compatriots who are dead.);
12. Strongly suggesting that austere, precise national or household means 
testing is inappropriate because it runs down working capital which is 
needed for rehabilitation and also normatively objectionable since 
substantial emergency programmes are virtually always to households and 
countries who - at least in the presence of calamity - are at socially 
unacceptable standards of poverty and misery. (If resources are 
inadequate 'rationing' may be necessary but the target should be 
related to true need and the shortfall visible not concealed by 
trimming the need to meet some idea of what "funders will bear".);
13. and a recognition that if survival and livelihood restoration are 
political economic priorities ("moral economy" in Adam Smith's perhaps 
more apt terminology) then conditioning support for them (as relatively 
broadly defined above) to external economic, domestic political or 
geopolitical objectives of donors is inappropriate (to use the mildest 
plausible term).
This agenda is certainly applicable in the North and in Southern African 
countries which do give significant priority to calamity coping by/for poor
households. In a sense it is also valid for domestic advocates of major
domestic political priority change. In a sense - the danger to an advocate 
in the North is a dusty answer but in - e.g. - Malawi, that to a domestic
advocate may be a dusty prison cell... or worse. Therefore, for the
external advocates and especially those with state backing, respect for 
domestic priorities and leadership objective can, at least in principle, 
clash with the priority for human survival and livelihood rehabilitation.
To this dilemma there are no easy answers and those there are can only be 
applied within realistic appraisals of contexts:
1 . if there is a substantially accountable government which does give some 
priority to emergency survival/poverty reduction outside intervention 
by means of "sticks" is unlikely to be appropriate (and intervention by
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using technical assistance to try to change basic priorities is likely 
to be quite ineffective);
2 . but in those circumstances substantial emergency programmes will in 
practice be accepted and can usually be tied to provision of national 
institutional and personnel inputs. Even if that "carrot" may well not 
be the government's first choice, it is likely to be accepted;
3. with the side result of building up the domestic base for emergency 
survival and reconstruction/poverty reduction prioritisation;
4. while withholding or underfunding emergency support is usually quite 
unlikely to cause basic domestic political economic change and 
certainly does not help afflicted people survive;
5. but contexts do exist (though not in Mozambique or Angola) in which 
national governing group priorities are totally inimical to survival, 
let alone rehabilitation, support and mass diversion of resources to 
elite uses with little left for intended beneficiaries is quite 
predictable (e.g. Somalia, Sudan);
6 . in these cases tightly externally supervised programmes (with the 
maximum feasible involvement of domestic civil society and - if 
appropriate - local governance bodies) is likely to be the least bad 
attainable option with the "stick" not usually a threat to halt 
emergency support but to review and reduce other economic and political 
support;
7 . with the possible exception of de facto international 'trusteeship'
emergency operations if and when both near total lack of both civil
governance and very limited capacity to resist armed protection of 
operations (e.g. Somalia) or a global context which renders the 
government a pariah (e.g. in respect to Iraqi Kurdistan) make them 
possible.
The argument that some governments behave in ways forfeiting their claim to 
sovereignty because violation of basic human rights is integral, not 
incidental, to their governance is valid. However, there is little reason
to believe effective international intervention to reform or to replace
such regimes is generally practicable (vide Sudan, Serbia, Croatia, or, 
indeed, so far as the North went, Idi Amin's Uganda regime). Further,
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whether such intervention could quickly lead to a peaceful context or to a 
transition toward a better national regime is problematic. It is, however 
unfortunately, clear that the use of an international trustee force to 
topple the last Ethiopian emperor of the House of Menelik (Mengistu) was 
never on any realistic agenda and that - however unsatisfactory - the 
external support that was injected did save lives (and could have saved 
more had low income household livelihood rehabilitation been included) 
while at the same time it is doubtful that it delayed the overthrow of the 
regime.
These conclusions in respect to domestic priorities may appear pessimistic 
but more by comparison with utopia than with present reality. No Southern 
African regime - and certainly not Mozambique or Angola - will reject 
emergency assistance targeted to severely affected people (even if at least 
one regime is very reticent about admitting to crises and Angola - partly 
from bitter experience - does not set much stock in refining and promoting 
international appeals). Even in the low domestic political economic 
priority cases substantial progress on the thirteen point agenda is 
practicable and would save lives and rehabilitate livelihoods quite 
literally in their thousands.
As noted, the Angolan and, especially, Mozambican contexts are among the 
more - not less - promising. The political economic logic, economic 
recovery potential perceptions and electoral imperatives of the Mozambican 
government and leading party require it to place Reconstruction/Livelihood 
Rehabilitation at the top of its priority list. Its divergences with the 
international community are about ways and means and especially about that 
community's predilection with injecting multiple, expatriate run, non- 
accountable Platonic guardianships which objectively fragment and 
decapacitate Mozambican governance (at all levels) and civil society.
III.
What Prospects? When?
To discuss transition from Emergency Survival to Reconstruction Livelihood 
Rehabilitation requires taking a view on:
a. when war will end with what degree of residual insecurity;
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b. where war afflicted households will go;
c. how fast and how much via 'official channels' the return to rural homes 
will be.
In Mozambique full scale war is probably over. RENAMO's military (albeit 
not terror or killing) capacity has ebbed dramatically since 1988. 
Ironically the final coffin crafting was done by the drought. "Control 
zone" civilian populations became a short term liability unable to feed 
themselves, let alone the combatants. Further, because up to 90% of 
combatant missions were raids to secure food, it was no longer possible to 
hold coerced households in place. But in the longer term the loss of its 
food growing base threatened RENAMO's survival just as the decline of 
population in areas it controlled to (probably) under 5% would erode what 
credibility it had.
At least half the estimated 10,000 RENAMO combatants are in units which 
have whole heartedly accepted the cease-fire and sought reconciliation 
(including food and medical services for ex-combatants and household 
members) while up to a tenth were removed from the ranks of effective 
combatants in the abortive mid-October offensive in violation of the cease­
fire. Mr. Dhlakama and his closest lieutenants and external advisers (who 
appear to have a rather poor grasp of on the ground realities) do not have 
the means to restart a full scale war.
A real question is the level of residual banditry. In the late 1980s a US 
State Department study showed over 90% of attacks on households who became 
refugees involved RENAMO and under 5% each government forces and 'others' 
(free-lance bandits and unidentified). The weakening of RENAMO has led to 
a rise of freelance banditry as have weak logistics in feeding government 
units who (understandably) desert and may become bandits. If demobil­
isation is into penury, ex-combatants (from both armed forces) will swell 
bandit ranks. This is a point which is perfectly evident to the government 
and on which tentative indications of external support for rehabilitation 
of ex-combatant livelihoods give grounds for cautious optimism.
The Angola prospects are less clear. UNITA - now deserted by both its RSA 
and USA former backers - cannot win a renewed war. However, it most 
certainly can renew the war and destroy security in a high proportion of 
rural Angola.
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Whether it will do so or use the threat of doing so to bargain for central 
and provincial government posts is unclear. So is whether it would view 
such power sharing as a government of national unity or a new means to 
pursue its struggle for total dominance by non-electoral methods.
Therefore it is hard to describe Angolan prospects for peace in the short 
term as better than problematic and even harder to express full confidence 
that an initial peaceful solution will lead to a stable reconciliation 
process. Given the large number of ex-combatants (up to 50,000) who have 
demobilised themselves - presumably with guns - and the weakness of 
programmes to reintegrate demobilisados, the prospects for banditry (or 
rather for its limitation) are probably poorer than Mozambique. On the 
other hand, the Angolan state has the experienced personnel, arms and 
resources to build up a stronger paramilitary police force than does 
Mozambique.
Mozambique's baseline assumptions of 100% return home by non-urban war 
afflicted households and 0% for those resident in cimentos (centre cities) 
and canisas ('townships' - suburbs) are not literally realistic. However, 
fragmentary data from asking deslocados, affectados and refugees does 
suggest 90% do wish, and intend, to go home as soon as it is safe in 
security terms. The 300,000 to 400,000 returnados (from transborder 
refugee camps or informal residence with community members) bear out these 
statements. They have returned - particularly to Tete Province - in large 
numbers, 90% with no official assistance, as soon as they perceived it as 
relatively safe to resume cultivation and to do at least temporary home 
reconstruction. Virtually none have migrated to cities or large towns.
Very few rural and ex-urban affectados perceive themselves as 
satisfactorily resettled. For most this is self-evident - crammed into the 
ex-urban perimeters of canisas, on coastal sand dunes and into overcrowded 
areas with on average less than a hectare of usually sub-standard land.
Even most of the minority on formal resettlement schemes express a desire 
to return home - partly because security has prevented opening up adequate 
land and partly from a desire to recreate known local civil society 
structures. The limited exceptions are affectados who are fairly near 
their old homes, in areas with adequate access to good land and within the 
home area of people of the same or a closely linked cultural group. The 
only large group in this category - the residents of the self-established
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new villages in the Beira Corridor north of Dond and south of ex-urban 
Chimoio - are in fact usually not counted as affectados.
Officially deslocados are camp residents and affectados are displaced 
persons outside core urban areas. However, it is realised part of the 
massive 1980-91 urban influx are deslocados - a perception confirmed by the 
1992 Maputo Household Survey. With even present urbanisation under 25% 
(comparable to Tanzania and well below Zimbabwe or Zambia although above 
Malawi) a question arises as to how many are general urban drift migrants 
rather than temporarily war displaced households. Those who are destitute 
with no real foothold in the urban economy may go home, but for the others 
moves would mean the immediate loss of present - even if inadequate - urban 
livelihoods for a problematic future recovery of rural ones.
Urban livelihood rehabilitation - at least in Angola and Mozambique - poses 
rather different issues than rural. About 50% of urban residents (based on 
household studies in Mozambique and fragmentary evidence in Angola) are 
either destitute or absolutely poor. At least in Mozambique most of this 
group are not forced migrants. Employment enabling, direct employment, 
basic service access, small scale infrastructure and supplementary income 
transfer schemes would appear to be best organised to empower the total 
absolutely poor/destitute group not divided into urban born-voluntary 
migrant-forced migrant parallel slices.
In Angola no comparable coordination of data to arrive at overall estimates 
appears to have taken place. Demobilisado data on future occupations — 
especially for former government troops - appear to represent aspirations 
not operational intentions. (Even ex-UNITA troops 80% rural preferences 
included an unattainably high proportion of merchants.) The much higher 
numbers and proportions of urban resident forced migrants suggest both:
a.) a likelihood of significant return home flows from towns (the apparent 
40% urbanisation is unsustainably high for a country with Angola's economic 
structure) and b.) even more daunting urban employment/real income/service 
access/infrastructural/safety net problems than those confronting 
Mozambique. Certainly Luanda - even in the core cement city - already 
functions less well than Maputo.
The question of how Boon forced migrants plan to return home receives 
fairly uniform and both reassuring and alarming answers. They can be 
summed up as: the moment we consider it safe. This is reassuring in the
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sense that it indicates a firm desire to regain lost livelihoods and to end 
dependence on inadequate and uncertain handouts. In many camps the 
tenacity and ingenuity with which income earning activities have been 
attempted goes to confirm the reality of this commitment to self­
reconstruction of livelihoods. So does the experience - particularly in 
Tete Province - of large scale return from exile as soon as minimum 
security had been restored.
The absence of any caveat as to availability of emergency programme 
transport, seed, tools or food until harvest strongly suggests many returns 
will be (in Mozambique now are) before any significant "official channels" 
to monitor, much less provide logistical support for, them can be created.
That raises the alarming side. Few deslocados, affectados or refugees can 
hope to take adequate seeds, tools and food home with them. For those 
returning to bush covered fields and collapsed (even if not burnt) homes in 
the midst of the worst drought in over 100 years when the emergency network 
is constructed to deliver to camps in districts of refuge not villages in 
districts of exodus/return a rush home is all too likely to be life 
threatening.
The Tete precedent is not as reassuring as it might appear. Most 
returnados had limited distances to travel, many had raised food in Malawi, 
1988-89-90 were good harvest years in Tete, many households phased their 
move with a "transborder period" keeping one foot safely in Malawi until 
their Mozambican livelihood was substantially reconstructed and relative 
security was perceived as likely to continue. These factors are not 
generalisable albeit they may apply to many refugees and deslocados in 
Tanzania, Cabo Delgado, Niassa and - after the 1992/93 rains if they are 
good - parts of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Southern Malawi, Zambesia and Nampula.
In Manica, Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo (rural) the aftermath of the 
1991/92 drought and the extreme 1992 seed shortage will still make self 
help one stage return very problematic.
There is little reason to suppose the Angolan situation is radically 
different - except that the absence of peace clearly deters return home at 
the present time. In both cases reconstruction/rehabilitation programming 
will inevitably be in the anomalous position of the leader who says: "Oh,
there go my people. I must run after them to catch up because I am their 
leader". The situation is unfortunately not facetious - if emergency and
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refugee programmes are not shifted to supporting actual (not 
administratively or technically desired) population movements and worse 
yet, if they are wound down rather than converted to support 
reconstruction, then peace and return home may kill almost as many people 
as did war and forced migration.
The constraints on speedy official/domestic NGO action - largely created by 
the disastrous decapacitation of Mozambican institutions and civil society 
bodies by the way external actors have insisted on addressing the 
continuing emergency - mean that priority attention needs to be given to 
identifying and supporting returnee household coping mechanisms - for 
examples
a. temporary return of one or more adults and juveniles to clear, rebuild 
and plant with periods back in camp and a permanent return home only at 
the time of the first substantial harvest:
b. unofficial permanent return home of one or more members of the 
household with the others remaining in camp or on affectado assisting 
NGO or local governance lists and drawing rations for the pioneer 
returnees until a harvest is won;
c. reconnaissance mission followed by return if conditions appear 
unpropitious.
Each of these improves survival and rehabilitation chances. Each makes 
creative use of refugee or deslocado camp or affectado support list as a 
base from which to make forays to attack the livelihood restoration 
challenge. (Such base camp use is relatively common, e.g. Somali refugee 
camp demographic data over time demonstrated that most working age refugees 
were only intermittently present and normally were working elsewhere in 
Somalia or abroad.) However, each violates UNHCR and normal Emergency 
Programme procedures and can be misread as fraudulent distribution to 
ghosts or as failure to encourage rapid return.
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IV.
Toward Reconatruction and Rehabilitation - Rural
The requirements to enable forced migrants returning to rural areas to
rehabilitate their livelihoods are relatively straightforward to sketch
out:
1 . access to adequate, appropriate land on secure, hereditable use tenure 
basis;
2 . transport home - especially in cases in which their present residence
of refuge is over 50 km away;
3. provision of tool kits (to clear bush, to rebuild homes, to plant and
to till crops);
4. parallel provision of basic household kits (not least pails to reduce
water collection time and where destitution is near total - e.g.
deslocados from RENAMO controlled zones - clothing);
5. initial seeds for planting, core smallstock and poultry (and to the
extent possible cattle and oxen) as well as simple fishing gear to
fishing village returnees;
6 . food for the returnees to survive until they can win a harvest
(effectively circulating capital in the Smithian/Marxian sense of that
term);
7. restoration of basic human and social investment services - primary and 
adult education primary health care, water, agricultural extension;
8 . rebuilding of local infrastructure - roads, bridges, culverts, the
fixed capital of basic services (especially houses for personnel),
administrative and market structures;
9. restoration of market access, e.g. through (commercial) loans to 
produce buyer-transporter-goods seller enterprises (private or 
cooperative) to recreate the rural commercial network;
10. augmentation of household sector cash incomes - especially until crop,
livestock and fish production becomes adequate to allow significant
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sales - e.g. by using labour intensive seasonal approaches to 
infrastructure restoration.
To articulate these into operational programmes at national level is not 
particularly difficult (if political priority for doing so exists, as it 
does in Mozambique). The problem of identifying numbers to be served and 
particular elements (e.g. number of health posts where) is unmanageable 
nationally. Ideally it should be decentralised to district level. Given 
the appalling weakness of District level personnel in Mozambique and Angola 
(not only absolutely but in comparison with - e.g. - Zimbabwe or Tanzania 
where District staff levels and capacities are almost comparable to 
Mozambican Provincial capacity), the interim approach almost has to be 
Provincial (except for information flow and routine operations) coordinated 
by Provincial Planning Commissions. Preliminary Mozambique results (which 
also entail restoring CPP capacity and sense of direction) suggest this is 
possible.
Institutional and temporal problems however are daunting. Emergency 
networks are oriented to deliveries to camps in areas of refuge - not to 
sub-district level in areas of return. Further, their basic operations 
have been food delivery focused (backed by some seed and a fairly 
negligible volume of other items), in a survival context not a 
rehabilitation package providing a reconstruction context. However, they 
have the only available delivery and logistical coordination mechanisms so 
need to handle items 2 through 6 on the list. Their involvement with 7 and 
8 , however, should switch at once to Provincial and Ministerial 
directorates (possible with an interim funds collection and automatic 
transfer residual role until clear Reconstruction Plan financial 
mobilisation modalities are up and running) because parallel health, 
education, water, works and transport plans and budgets are not efficient.
Luckily, decentralisation - more accurately as much formalising the wide 
range of de facto autonomies Provinces have but often fail to use, and of 
backing them by capital budget allocations comparable to recurrent, as of 
making new allocations of responsibility/authority - is already on the 
Mozambican agenda. Whether it is on the Angolan is less clear. But to 
work decentralisation requires:
a. increased personnel capacity (including massive upgrading and remedial 
training) first at Provincial and then at District levels;
32
b. parallel broadening of participation of sector familial members 
particularly in programme component identification and prioritisation 
(e.g. through participatory rapid rural appraisal) and review (perhaps 
via District and Provincial Assemblies);
c. building up domestic civil society/NGO (churches, mosques, women's 
groups, Red Cross chapters, co-ops, village associations) capacity to 
act (including making external NGOs accountable to them and 
generalising the Christian Aid pattern of operating through its 
domestic analogue and the Action Aid one of very close coordination 
with/action through local governance units).
Land allocation is a key example of the necessity for participatory 
decentralisation. In most Districts of return there is no absolute land 
shortage and forced migrants (and neighbours) know whose land is where. 
Nobody else does. The Portuguese viewed African sector familial land as a 
residual they had not yet had occasion to steal for settlers, plantation 
companies or concessionaires. The independence Land Act is based on total 
non-knowledge of sector familial land tenure practices (or holdings) and 
central allocation (however unintentionally) has followed Portuguese 
practice.
The only evident prompt way to achieve speedy, adequate, secure allocations 
to returning households is to use village/sub-district elder's committees 
and local mediation in the case of conflicts with initial registration at 
District level. Abandoned plantations and commercial farms should be 
allocable as well as previous sector familial land and no land allocations 
(except of ex-plantation or ex-settler land known to be unoccupied) should 
be made to outsiders (corporate or individual; citizen or foreigner) until 
return is reasonably complete and genuinely vacant (not including long 
rotation reserve) land can be identified and allocated at Provincial level. 
This approach sounds simple and can be at local level. Central allocation 
would be totally impracticable. There is a growing body of Provincial and 
- in some institutions - Central government opinion in support of this 
approach. In general - judging from experience elsewhere, including 
Tanzania - evolving historic African secure, hereditable, use tenure 
systems with local allocations to households work reasonably well in 
conditions other than severe scarcity of good land.
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The one reform probably needing immediate implementation(by a national 
guide-line directive) is equal access for female headed households. 
Traditionally some adult male was responsible for any female so a female 
headed household could not, by definition, exist. The responsibility leg 
of this approach no longer functions uniformly and at least 25% of 
returning households will be female headed, so this is one area in which 
local diversity should be avoided.
The worst problems are perceptional and temporal. The temporal one is 
appallingly simple:
a. most refugees, deslocados and affectados will move home as soon as they 
believe it to be safe;
b. while their judgement of physical security is - on past evidence - 
good, that of food availability - also on past evidence - is uneven;
c. in the present context of drought (with water and food scarce) 
returning home is likely over wide ranges of Mozambique to be life 
threatening unless and until sub-district registration and food-tool- 
seed kit distribution centres are set up;
d. because of bush clearing and home rebuilding requirements the optimal 
'window of return' is April/August 1993 which would allow time to re­
focus Emergencia's logistics network and for 1992/93 rains and the main 
1993 harvest to reduce water and food constraints;
e. but although the official government (and many NGOs) position advocates 
such delayed return it is unlikely their appeals will have much weight;
f. and, unfortunately,national coping mechanisms keeping some family 
members in camp (at least part of the time) to draw rations while 
others restore the livelihood base are likely to be perceived by at 
least some aid agencies and NGOs as fraud, not as sensible household 
survival and recovery strategies which reduce the present risks to life 
and enhance the future livelihood regaining prospect of forced 
migrants.
The last point is one of the areas in which a radical change in perspective 
is needed. Except for short distance returnees able to build up a food 
reserve in their place of refuge (significant numbers of Malawi and
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Tanzania based refugees but virtually no deslocados and few affectados) a 
food as working capital supply until crops are won is a necessary input 
into rehabilitation.
A second necessary perception change is acceptance that the practicable 
must dominate the preferable (or under different circumstances even 
operationally desirable). A neat five year Reconstrucao exercise is 
heuristically useful but only if modified to take account of the 
uncertainties of how many will return where, when, of how many resources 
can be mobilised from which sources for what uses, how fast. Interim 
measures will be needed: e.g. 1992 and 1993 financing of the food and kit 
package via Emergencia and indeed using it to distribute them because other 
funding and distributing channels cannot be set up in time.
The third reformulation is that of shifting from an emergency survival to a 
reconstruction through rehabilitation of livelihoods mode. Emergencia is a 
particular problem in this respect (as a fortiori are its 'advisors' CARE).
Broad access, low unit cost, minimum necessary administration as key 
criteria also represent a change of vision - less perhaps for emergency 
operations than for others. Donors and their technical advisers tend to 
'gold plate' proposed projects in ways raising unit costs, limiting access 
and multiplying high level (in practice expatriate) personnel requirements 
- and take 18 months to send back their 'improved' (mutant?) 
counterproposals. For supporting and enabling the 50% of Mozambicans who 
are forced migrants that is a disastrous optic.
Similarly, whether to give initial food rations and kits or provide them on 
term loan and whether to needs test returnees are not ultimately issues of 
ideology or theory but of realism. 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 $100 household kit loans 
repayable over five years would cost more to administer than could be 
collected and would prevent any sane priorities for financial sector 
rehabilitation - unlike 3,000 to 5,000 commercial rate loans to rural 
commercial enterprises which would be manageable and could contribute to 
financial sector capacity building. Similarly, 80% of returning forced 
migrants will be destitute and 19% "absolutely poor but not destitute". To 
suppose it is worth spending scarce time trying to identify the 1% or that 
grant support in the year of return will hamper market recovery is absurd.
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Related is the need to have approximately correct numbers soon enough to 
use - not precisely wrong projections or highly sophisticated surveys 
processed three years after the event. Subsidiarity applies - detailed 
data on numbers are needed at district level and less detailed aggregations 
at provincial and national. For refugees this is urgent. If one adds 
Malawi data on registered refugees from Tete and Mozambique Red Cross data 
on present Tete residents the total is 1,400,000 whereas the highest 
plausible population total is 1,000,000. One cannot do even draft 
logistical or financial planning on that margin of error. The deus ex 
machina of households partly or largely returned to Mozambique but keeping 
a foothold (rationhold in Malawi camps) could (if widespread) reduce the 
gap but hardly eliminate it.
A special conceptual problem can be put as limiting leakage without 
creating non-functional absurdity. Schools for farmer forced migrants 
alone make no sense; but nor does criticising rural road deconstruction or 
agricultural extension because others will benefit too. More 
controversially is one believes access to - preferably competitive - 
markets if crucial to livelihood rehabilitation there is a need to identify 
the capital requirements (basically lorries and stocks of goods) of small 
scale rural merchant/transporters and whether loan finance is in fact 
available to meet them. Commercial rate loans to such entrepreneurs 
(private or co-operational) and their use as haulage subcontractors for 
other programme elements of absolutely poor, returning forced migrants. To 
argue the reverse is remarkably pure reductionism - even Chairman Mao's 
avowed rural goal was "all boats float higher".
The final two perception changes needed relate to coordination and 
wholeness. If one accepts the proposition that the core requirements - 
after divergent transport and demobilisation allowance elements - of rural 
refugees, deslocados, affectados, demobilisados and pauperised in place 
households are basically the same with variety within more than between 
groups then it follows there should be a common set of programmes operated 
at District and Provincial levels and largely designed and budgeted at 
Provincial within a common national strategic framework. Doubtless 
numerous institutions need to be involved - one hardly wants a super 
urgency muddling up agricultural extension, village health worker training, 
labour intensive works etc. at detailed design or operational level. But
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they are not divided among categories of war afflicted absolutely poor 
rural households.
In practice UNHCR, UNDP and Emergencia bodies do not perceive the problem 
that way. Each looks at its piece of the problem and stakes out territory 
by proposing separate programme (all of them totally outside mainline 
ministerial and territorial administrative or legislative structures).
This is not in the interests of forced migrants not of national, 
governmental and civil society recapacitation. Au contrairel
There are no inherent barriers to a single strategic approach: a) UNHCR's
mandate does allow it to expend funds on former refugee livelihood 
rehabilitation via agents. Thus it could fund a proportion of agreed 
programme cost equal to the proportion of ex-refugees among programme 
beneficiaries; b) UNDP's purpose is providing support for government 
strategic goals and coordinating that of other UN family bodies (excluding 
in practice the IMF and World Bank) not of creating or maintaining parallel 
national logistical or planning mechanisms for itself and WFP; c) the 
permanent role of Emergencia bodies is in respect to calamities and their 
expertise in the logistics of distribution of a limited range of goods not 
parallel government operations fragmenting water, health, education and 
works programming.
Finally, external bodies (well beyond UNHCR and UNDP) need to consider 
whether they intend to operate reconstruction as independent Platonic 
guardians. With the best will in the world - which is not always present - 
that approach fragments and decapacitates host government and domestic 
NGOs/civil society bodies. Also it makes a mockery of external preaching 
of participation and accountability - e.g. how USAID and CARE operate 
speaks much more loudly than how they enjoin others to operate.
If a strategic priority for reconstruction in support of rural forced 
migrant household livelihood rehabilitation is to function effectively and 
to contribute to participatory governance it must be "locally owned" (as 
the World Bank says, and to a growing extent practices in respect to 
Structural Adjustment Policy Framework Papers - especially ones on poverty 
vide the Mozambique PPFP). That does require much more operation within 
national, provincial and regional frameworks; more agreed division of 
labour; greater accountability to domestic actors (including accepting the 
validity of their basic goals and approaches unless they are demonstrably
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wrong or impracticable); less 'independent' external operations; more 
secondment of staff to serve as temporary Angolan or Mozambican civil (or 
civil society agency) servants. It is a challenge just as much to most 
NGOs as to bilateral and multilateral aid agencies.
How far either Mozambique or Angola has proceeded on this list of 
perception changes is unclear. Mozambique has made a unified, Mozambican 
led, decentralised Reconstrucao strategy a top priority. The other 
perception/conceptualisation issues are certainly under debate - heated 
debate at times. But in respect to the foreign agency issues Mozambique is 
so heavily trapped into dependence on their resources as to fear to speak 
as strongly as many Mozambicans feel. Objectively it does not have the 
degrees of freedom to "call the shots" which Botswana - or even Tanzania - 
has and exercises. Angola does not appear (at least from outside the 
government structure) to have gone as far in prioritising either 
Reconstrucao or poverty reduction, decentralisation or livelihood 
rehabilitation so Mozambique, partly because of its difficult historic war- 
survival-groping towards peace process. On the other hand, precisely 
because its has received far less financial, food or personnel support it 
is better placed to act on its own priorities and perspectives using 
external actors in complementary roles and effectively resisting their 
efforts to dominate.
V.
Absolute Poverty Reduction - Urban Aspects
The question of how to enable urban resident affectados who choose not to 
return to rural areas to rise out of absolute poverty or destitution is 
harder to reconceptualise at strategic level than is the rural. In fact 
the forced migrant focus may be - in Mozambique almost certainly is - a 
poor entry point to reducing urban poverty.
1 . the largest single contribution to reviving urban employment and
incomes would be revival of rural production (providing food and raw 
materials which create through their sale effective demand for urban 
goods and services). This is particularly true of Mozambique but also
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relevant to Angola whose oil enclave is much more a revenue focus than 
a major source of demand for domestic production;
2 . the main mechanism for reducing absolute poverty is increasing real 
wages (currently - after an increase fought through in the teeth of 
external opposition - about $20 a month versus a $75 per month 
household absolute poverty line in Mozambique) both to reduce poverty 
and to increase economic efficiency (which turns on labour cost per 
unit of output not per day);
3. with the second key mechanism increasing both recorded and unrecorded 
(so called "informal sector") wage employment;
4 . plus some form of safety net income transfers to destitute households 
(which in Maputo include these of up to 30% of civil servants!);
5. in a context in which absolute poverty is of the order of 50% and 
within it destitution (under $50 a month household expenditure) up to 
30%;
6 . and in which the typical household above the destitution line has more 
than one source of income and more than one earner - including at least 
one recorded wage earner;
7. while most destitute and absolutely poor households suffer from low 
real wages and too many mouths per economically active pair of hands, 
not unemployment nor literal underemployment in the sense of unused 
time.
This model is based on the Maputo Household Survey and its analysis in the 
context of Mozambique's strategic priority to absolute poverty reduction.
It may be less applicable to Luanda (assuming its up to 500,000 clear war 
pushed residents seek to remain there after peace is restored). There 
creating more recorded or "informal" (micro enterprise, construction team, 
artisanal and petty commercial "day credit", i.e. or putting out or day 
labour) employment might logically take pride of place but real wage 
increases and safety nets would be important complements in any holistic 
approach.
The model suggests that while in rural areas livelihood rehabilitation for 
forced migrants and other war afflicted (pauperised in place, demobilisado)
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households is the appropriate strategic organising focus in urban areas it 
is absolutely poor/destitute household livelihood rehabilitation which 
provided the best focus. In Mozambique under 5% of forced migrants are 
urban residents and they constitute under 15% of the urban absolutely poor 
with not very evident special characteristics differentiating them from 
other absolutely poor households in ways either justifying or requiring 
separate programmes.
There is another problem at strategic level - urban poverty reduction 
programming in SSA has had little systematic attention and less success, 
partly because until the 1980s urban absolutely poor were a very small 
proportion of all absolutely poor households and also were - or at least 
were believed to be - a small proportion of all urban households. A check 
list of component measures toward a strategy can be identified but even in 
Mozambique (and even more in Angola) most are not clearly articulated nor 
is there capacity for more than broad "testing" type operations:
1 . protecting real minimum wages and pushing them up within five years to 
50% to 60% of the households absolute poverty line;
2 . operating within a macro economic policy framework and with a 
complementary rural Reconstrucao strategy enabling and fuelling revival 
of urban purchases from and production/sales to the countryside to 
boost employment (recorded and "informal") and real wages;
3. providing technical assistance, training and (commercial rate) credit 
to micro enterprises and to artisans/household enterprises;
4. restoring and expanding small scale peri urban (canisa) infrastructure 
(e.g. roads, drainage, zonas verdes infrastructure as well as that for 
primary health, education and water supply services);
5. expanding basic human and social investment services (health-education- 
water-sanitation-extension) toward universal access;
6 . creating income transfer safety nets for destitute households.
In each area there are working examples in Mozambique (the income transfer 
safety net now reaches 100,000 people rising at 7,500 to 10,000 per month 
toward a nominal eligibility estimate of 900,000) but there is not to date, 
broad access (even on basic services beyond health and the first three
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years of education) nor an integrated strategic approach. Angola - partly 
because of a tendency to favour the large scale and capital intensive, i.e. 
"modern" which is much stronger and, up to a point, more financeable than 
in Mozambique - has not moved as far except for primary education and, 
perhaps, primary health care.
VI.
Is Reconstrucao Financeable? Sustainable? Efficient?
No strategic option in Sub-Saharan Africa is saleable unless it can 
demonstrate some claim to be financeable, financially sustainable once 
initial resource injections are completed and at least moderately output 
value/input cost efficient. That is particularly true of countries whose 
budgets, import capacity and senior technical personnel cadres are heavily 
dependent on external transfers. The "particularly" certainly applies to 
Mozambique but much less to Angola. The basic point does apply to Angola 
which has had a somewhat higher production, technical potential, 
export/revenue focus in its allocation policy than Mozambique which has 
(not always very effectively) given high priority to Adam Smith's 
interlocked dictums that no nation could be great and prosperous so long as 
the majority of its citizens were poor and miserable; that empowering them 
to climb out of that condition was a "moral economic" priority and that 
ensuring or creating an enabling climate for such empowerment was a prime 
duty of the state.
To attempt detailed macro economic costings and output generation impact, 
export/import and revenue generation vs costs of continuing (basic 
service/infrastructure/safety net) operations after Reconstrucao proper as 
well as potential contributions to national food balance and reduction of 
the proportion of households in absolute poverty in either Angola or 
Mozambique has, at present, a certain resemblance to trying to make a brick 
wall from a handful of straws.
However, fairly rough orders of magnitude projections which have some claim 
to being attainable can be made. To do so is necessary to validate the 
strategy as potentially feasible (and thereby to mobilise resources for it) 
and to create a workable overall framework for articulating, phasing,
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financing and acting. Mozambique has carried out such an exercise. Tables 
showing some of the main parameters - but having in themselves no official 
standing - appear as the Annex to this paper. No similar exercise - and 
especially quantification - appears to have been attempted in Angola.
One point not. clearly stressed in the Tables is very important. The total 
annual cost to the international community of Emergency Programme support 
to Mozambique and to Mozambican refugees is of the order of $500 million a 
year. Therefore, over a nominal (and for institutional, personnel and 
knowledge reasons, probably actual) five year Reconstrucao/Rehabilitacao 
Programme a total of $2,500 million (less continuing survival support 
especially in the first two years) can be made available without 
additional overall external transfers. The total programme cost is 
estimated at $2,000 million (Annex - Tables 2, 3 and 4).
More detailed implications from the projections are:
a. a cost of $1,750 per household whose livelihood rehabilitation is made 
possible (plus about $1,500 of its own labour and time investment in 
clearing, rebuilding and training) including services, infrastructure, 
loans for employment and commercial network restoration and expansion;
b. with an overall GDP payoff by the year after the 5 Year Programme 
(nominally 1998/99) of the order of $900 million;
c. a "1998/99" net budgeting improvement of $20 million plus (including a 
$50 million reduction of defence costs);
d. a broadly neutral ($140 million each way) external balance impact;
e. on the order of 3,000,000 tonnes grain equivalent additional food 
production allowing a national food deficit reduction to about 7% (1 0% 
urban/6% rural) consistent with a reduction in food aid from 500,000 to
2 0 0 ,0 0 0  tonnes;
f. absolute poverty reduction from 65% of all households in 1990/91 to 24% 
in 1998/99 (and from 90% to 25% for the 1,000,000 households requiring 
livelihood rehabilitation empowerment);
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g. significant increases in total external resource transfers in the first 
half of the programme period (against a base excluding refugee support) 
but lower ones by the end of the programme.
These results appear to be attainable (assuming the strategy is sold and 
funded) even if they are clearly order of magnitude not econometric 
projections. In one sense they are very modest - restoring Mozambique's 
overall household social and economic position as of 1998/99 to slightly 
better than Tanzania's today. But for absolutely poor Mozambicans that 
would be a massive achievement and would lay a base (not least in restored 
confidence in the possibility of forward progress) for a positive dynamic 
from the achieved base.
The main conclusions which may - however tentatively - be drawn from
available evidence are:
1 . rehabilitation of the livelihoods of forced migrants is central to the 
rural economic, food balance and human restoration of both Angola and 
of Mozambique;
2. in the case of Angola, it is not central to overall macroeconomic 
growth but in Mozambique it is;
3. to carry out such an absolute poverty reduction focused Reconstruction 
strategy is technically feasible and - at least in Mozambique - has the 
firm backing of some of the political and institutional big battalions;
4. but the reconceptualisation (including that of Emergencia optics from 
survival to rehabilitation) and the technical difficulties are 
daunting;
5. and - for Mozambique at least - so is mobilisation of required levels 
of donor conviction to secure crucial external resource transfers;
6 . even though reasonable projections suggest macroeconomic viability and 
sustainability conditions can be met and substantial progress toward 
food sufficiency and absolute poverty reduction goals made over five 
years.
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That is a set of conclusions which - if accepted - are a prolegomenon to
action. To advocate them as a basis for action is akin to the Sukuma
proverb s
Rabbit, rabbit where are you going?
I'm going out to kill the elephant.
Rabbit, rabbit can you really do that?
Well, I'll try and try again.
Perhaps unfortunately, while the tale indicates that the rabbit did achieve
his goal it does not enlighten us as to howl
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Annex
Rural and Urban Livelihood Rehabilitation: 
Pro Forma Macroeconomic and Social 
Pro Forma for Mozambique
(Demi-official thinkpiece and heuristic exercise 
in context of Reconstrucao planning - June 1992)
Table 1
Rural livelihood Rehabilitation 1993/4 - 1997/8
Numbers of Households1 and Possible Phasing
Category 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 Total
Refugees (Ext­
ernally Displaced) 2 40,000 70,000 50,000 40,000 15,000 215,000
Displaced (Int­
ernal Refugees) 40,000 70,000 50,000 40,000 15,000 215,000
Affected (Forced 
To Move3 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 150,000 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 50,000 30,000 430,000
Pauperised In 
Place4 25,000 50,000 40,000 2 0 ,0 0 0 5,000 140,000
Demobilised
Ex-Combatants5 40,000 50,000 1 0 ,0 0 0 - - 1 0 0 ,0 0 0
Total6 245,000 390,000 250,000 150,000 65,000 1 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0
Notes:
1. Average household size estimated at 7 persons except for ex-Combatants estimated at 5.
Approximately 55% children under 15, 25% adult women, 20% adult men. One household in
4 female headed.
2. Official UNHCR estimates of 1.3 million persons exclude non-registered refugees in 
Zambia and also Swaziland and South Africa. On the other hand, they overstate Malawi 
where registering new arrivals is prompt and efficient but deleting returnees is 
neither, understandably from a Malawian perspective.
3. Households not in camps (effective distinctive characteristic of deslocados) forced to 
move by war and neither incorporated in urban life nor satisfactorily resettled from 
their own perspective (Many of new Beira Corridor residents are satisfactorily 
resettled but relatively few elsewhere).
4. Living in or near ruins of homes but with total or near total loss of residences, 
seeds, tools, food stocks, livestock.
5. Rural background households (20,000 in urban reconstruction estimates for urban 
background households).
6 . Phasing highly approximate. Constraints are drought, security, capacity of agencies 
and state to assist. Larger 1994/5 targets would be desirable but financial, personnel 
and institutional limitations would make them dangerous because unassisted returnees 
are likely to fail to re-establish themselves and to flee again or even - as has
happened - die.
Table 2
Rural Reconstruction: Toward Costing
(000 1991 Price $)
Category 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 Total13
A. Household Re­
establishment 117,500 187,500 122,500 77,500 36,500 540,000
Internal Transport1 
Food2
(12,500)
(75,000)
(2 0 ,0 0 0)
(1 2 0,0 0 0 )
(12,500) 
(80,000)
(7,500)
(50,000)
(3,000)
(25,000)
(55,000)
(350,000)
TooIs/Seeds/House­
hold Equipment3 (25,000) (40,000) (25,000) (15,000) (6 ,0 0 0 ) (1 1 0,0 0 0 )
Construction
Materials/
Simple Equipment'1 (5,000) (7,500) (5,000) (5,000) (2,500) (25,000)
B. Physical Infra­
structure Rehabil­
itation5 25,000 50,000 75,000 50,000 50,000 250,000
C. Basic Service Rest­
oration/Extension5 50,000 75,000 125,000 125,000 75,000 450,000
D. Market Revival 32,500 65,000 67,500 97,500 37,500 300,000
Retail Enterprise 
Infrastructure 
(Vehicles/Working 
Capital) 7 (25,000) (50,000) (50,000) (75,000) (25,000) (225,000)
Ditto Wholesale 
Enterprise® (5,000) (1 0 ,0 0 0) (1 0,0 0 0 ) (15,000) (1 0,0 0 0 ) (50,000)
Associated Public 
Infrastructure® (2,500) (5,000) (7,500) (7,500) (2,500) (25,000)
E. Associated Items 19,000 26,250 14,750 7,500 5,000 72,500
Refugee Return10 (5,000) (7,500) (5,000) (5,000) (2,500) (25,000)
Demobilisation
Allowances11 (9,000) (11,250) (2,250) - - (22,500)
Planning/Coordination 
(DNP, CCPs, Prov.
Works) 12 (5,000) (7,500) (7,500) (2,500) (2,500) (25,000)
TOTAL 244,000 303,750 404,750 357,500 304,000 1,612,500
Notes:
1. From present location to home area. $50/household.
2. 9 to 15 months to first main crop. $300-325/household including transport.
3. Tools to clear and till land and to rebuild home, tools, small stock, fishing 
equipment, seeds, basic household equipment - e.g. water pails. $100/household 
including transport.
4. Beams, poles, bricks, carpentry tools, block making machines, cement. Say $1,000 per 
village of 400 households.
5. Roads, culverts, ditches, small scale irrigation, ponds, other public buildings.
Rough breakdown:
Wages Seasonal Local Labour 125,000,000
Other Wages and Salaries 25,000,000
Hand Tools 10,000,000
Other Equipment 25,000,000
Construction Inputs (Pipe/Pumps/
Bitumen/Cement/Wood/etc.) 65,000,000
6 . Primary Health, Education, Agricultural Extension, Water.
Rough breakdown:
Wages, Salaries, Training 150,000,000
Operating Materials (Drugs/
Texts/Chalk/etc.) 100,000,000
Equipment (Blackboards, Furniture,
Vehicles, etc.) 75,000,000
Buildings, Other Fixed Plant 100,000,000
(Rural service expansion/rehabilitation recurrent and capital cumulative over five 
years.)
7. Loans to 2,500 newly re-established rural merchants/transporters at $40,000 each - 
lorry, stock in trade finance. Loans to 500-750 co-operatives (expansion of capital 
base or new activity) at comparable capital input. $100 million subsequent finance 
(loan) of vehicle-warehouse-working capital expansion in addition to reinvested 
enterprise earnings.
8 . Analogous to Note 7 for wholesale sector-private enterprises, co-ops and (as guarantor 
of minimum prices and of competition) Agricon.
9. Warehouses, markets, selected medium scale works.
10. $100-125 per person. Presumptively UNHCR financed. Subsequent expenses for refugees
incorporated in main programme heads. About 20% of totals.
11. Initial allowance of $150 per person at time of turning in gun and equipment. Plus 50%
addition for 'surplus' guns from Mozambique or South Africa turned in. Subsequent 
expenses incorporated in main programme heads (about 9% of totals).
12. Training, equipment, staff gap filling in coordination units - DNP, Provincial Planning 
Directorates - and crucial operating units especially Provincial Works Directorates 
(engineers, draughtsmen, artisans, foremen) to design/operate small fixed capital unit 
components of programme.
13. Rounded especially in "A" so line totals may not add exactly.
Table 3
(000 1991 Price $)
Category 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 Total13
A. Household
Re-establishment 13,000 20,500 19,500 18,000 13,000 84,000
Demobilisation1 (8,500) (1 0,0 0 0) (1,500) - - (19,500)
Interim Food 
Security2 (3,000) (8 ,0 0 0) (15,000) (15,000) (1 1 ,0 0 0) (52,000)
Artisanal Tools3 (500) (500) (500) (500) - (2 ,0 0 0)
Construction Materials/ 
Simple Equipment"1 (1,000) (2 ,0 0 0) (2,500) (2,500) (2 ,0 0 0) (1 0 ,0 0 0)
B. Secondary Urban 
Infrastructure 
Rehabilitation5 5,000 1 0 ,0 0 0 15,000 15,000 15,000 60,000
C. Basic Service Rehab­
ilitation/Extension5 1 0 ,0 0 0 15,000 25,000 25,000 15,00 90,000
D. Market Revival7 12,750 13,250 24,500 32,250 32,250 115,000
Small/Medium
Enterprise3 (7,500) (7,500) (15,000) (22,500) (22,500) (75,000)
Micro/Artisanal
Enterprise3 (3,750) (3,750) (7,500) (7,500) (7,500) (30,000)
Labour Intensive 
Technology10 (500) (1 ,0 0 0) (1 ,0 0 0) (1,250) (1,250) (5,000)
Financial System 
Training11 (1 ,0 0 0) (1,0 0 0) (1 ,0 0 0) (1 ,0 0 0) (1 ,0 0 0) (5,000)
E. Associated Items 3,000 3,500 1,250 1,250 1 ,0 0 0 1 0 ,0 0 0
Refugee Return12 
Demobilisation 
Planning/Coord­
ination
(N/A)
(2 ,0 0 0)
(1 ,0 0 0)
(N/A)
(2,500)
(1 ,0 0 0 )
(N/A)
(1,250)
(N/A)
(1,250)
(N/A)
(1 ,0 0 0)
(N/A)
(4.500)
(5.500)
TOTAL 43,750 62,250 82,250 91,500 76,250 358,000
Notes:
1. Assumes 20,000 households. If over one-sixth of estimated demobilised are urban in
origin this figure would be higher and analogous rural one lower. Divided into interim
employment/training/household equipment and allowance on turning in arms and equipment.
2. Approximately 80,000 waged urban households are below the absolute poverty line because
the minimum monthly salario is well below $30. In principle a food supplement (to
minimum wage for large households) and food subsidy programme do cover them as well as
the 120,000 who are in absolute poverty because of low household labour power. In fact 
both administrative and funding problems limit coverage. By 1996/97 the real minimum 
salario should - with recovery - have risen above $30 per month after which general 
economic development will be relevant to the 1 2 0 ,0 0 0 and to a degree the 80,000 (though 
to few of the 120,000). Interim coverage of 10,000 households in 1993/4, 25,000 in 
1994/5, 45,000 in 1996/7 and 35,000 in 1997/8 could reduce interim absolute poverty at 
$250 to $350 per year per household (including administration).
3. Many urban artisans (ex-artisans) cannot restore their livelihoods because they lack 
some or all of basic toolkit. Assumes 10,000 tool kits (tailors, builders, 
woodworkers, etc.) at average cost of $2 0 0 .
4. For self-help housing including neighbourhood block, brick making in canisas. Perhaps 
contributions - in kind - to 50,000 houses at $100 each and 500 neighbourhood simple 
equipment sets at $500 plus $2.5 million training in simple construction/construction 
material skills
5. Excludes centre city main works and all main roads. Primarily ditches, drainage, 
levelling, minor public buildings, markets, etc., in canisas and some similar 
supporting work in poorer concreto areas. To be organised on labour intensive basis.
6 . Rough estimate. Urban basic services are quantitatively less inadequate then rural but 
have significant quality problems. Figure excludes secondary/tertiary education and 
main hospitals but includes primary service worker (re)training and some secondary unit 
(e.g. small town hospital) rehabilitation or construction.
7. Market revival. While medium and large urban enterprises have more access to credit, 
present profit flows and foreign exchange than do rural this does not apply to 
artisanal, micro, small and newer medium scale ones other than urban transport. 
Employment, availability of goods/services, rehabilitation of two way urban-rural 
economic links all point to credit-training-technical services (e.g. accounting) 
packages accessible to these enterprises building on the Ministry of Labour and other 
body's experience.
8 . 1,000 enterprises at $50,000 average credit plus $25 million applied skill and 
managerial training, services (especially accounting), administration and research. 
Probable employment 10,000 to 15,000.
9. 2,000 enterprises at $10,000 average credit plus $10 million related training, 
services, administration. Probable employment 10,00 to 15,000.
10. Pilot projects, adaptation/training, popularisation with special reference to 
construction (including mainline Urban Rehabilitation and large building construction 
not itself included as part of Reconstrucao).
11. The medium through artisanal loan scheme's sustained success depends on 
training/retraining commercial bank (public and private) personnel to allow an adequate 
capacity to process and to evaluate loan applications promptly.
12. Very few refugees are from cities or large towns. Small town and rural wage earning 
households usually also engage (of necessity) in sector familial production. Therefore 
all refugees are treated as wage earners. Persons who chose to enter urban areas 
during war - rather than entering deslocado camps or affectado resettlement - are among 
intended beneficiaries of main Urban Reconstrucao programmes but are not targeted as a 
separate category.
13. Some totals may not add exactly because of rounding.
Table 4
National Reconstruction: Possible Funding Projections
($000 1991 Prices)
Category 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 Total
A. Reallocation3 40,000 190,000 290,000 345,000 325,000 1,190,000
From Emergencia2 - (50,000) (125,000) (2 0 0 ,0 0 0 ) (2 0 0,0 0 0 ) (575,000)
From Large 
Capital Projects3 (25,000) (1 0 0,0 0 0) (1 0 0,0 0 0) (75,000) (50,000) (350,000)
From Technical 
Assistance'1 (5,000) (1 0,0 0 0) (15,000) (2 0 ,0 0 0) (25,000) (75,000)
From Military 
Expenditure5’ (1 0,0 0 0) (30,000) (50,000) (50,000) (50,000) (190,000)
From Other Recurrent e NA NA NA NA NA ( - )
B. Special 79,500 121,500 95,000 73,500 44,500 414,000
Refugees2
Demobilisation3
(40,000)
(39,500)
(64,000)
(57,500)
(56.500)
(38.500)
(42,500)
(31,000)
(26,500)
(18,000)
229.500
184.500
C. Domestic 1 ,0 0 0 8 ,0 0 0 2 1 ,0 0 0 45,000 80,000 155,000
Fiscal Gain From 
Programme9 ( - ) (5,000) (15,000) (35,000) (65,000) (1 2 0,0 0 0)
User Contributions10 (1 ,0 0 0) (3,000) (5,000) (1 0,0 0 0) (15,000) (35,000)
D. Sub-total1 120,500 319,500 406,000 463,500 449,500 1,759,000
E. Additional
External Flow 
Needed1 1 166,500 46,500 84,000 (14,500) (69,250) 214,000
TOTAL12 287,750 366,000 490,000 449,000 380,250 1,973,000
Notes:
1. Reallocation from 1991/2 levels of expenditure. In 1991/2 prices except for minimum
salario rise to $40. Does not include reduction of UNHCR, host government, local
community contribution to refugees which now probably exceeds $250,000,000 a year.
2. Excludes additional (to 1991/2 based) drought related costs.
3. Existing projects and successors. Assumes some new large capital intensive projects
late in period with shift to developmento. Excludes new enterprise related, 
financially and externally self-liquidating enterprise investment, e.g. natural gas 
export, electricity production/transmission linked to exports (South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Swaziland) and to direct import substitution (Maputo).
4. Substitution of domestic training (in this programme) for overseas training and of 
support for qualified Mozambican for provision of expatriates.
5. Wages, arms, vehicles, equipment, ammunition, fuel, spares, rations. Calculations 
speculative until trend of security makes possible detailed military spending reduction 
programme.
6 . Total non Reconstrucao Recurrent spending is too low to provide basic minima of 
governance, services. Savings on some heads will be needed for increases on others.
7. UNHCR plus bilateral donors with peace promotion linked aid programmes (e.g. Japan). 
Calculated at external travel plus 20% of household rehabilitation and 10% of related 
service and infrastructure costs set out in Table 2. Refugees are 20% of total 
households covered.
8 . Separate funding from bilaterals specifically concerned with restoration of peace, e.g. 
Switzerland, Italy Japan. Includes direct demob payment plus 9% rural household plus 
related services/infrastructure costs from Table 2. Demobilised households are 
estimated at 9% of all covered. Table 3 programme for domobilisados includes year's 
interim employment plus retraining.
9. Roughly estimated at 20% of programme generated additions to commercialised Gross 
Domestic Production. See Table 5 for fuller estimation for 1998/99.
10. Very rough estimate. Includes labour, materials, food as well as cash contributions.
11. Requirement for grants, very soft loans or reductions in actual external debt service 
payments (excluding arrears write-off or non-serviceable portion of amounts nominally 
due). Numbers in ( ) are negative (i.e. reduction in external resource transfer 
requirement).
12. Equal To Costs from Tables 2, 3.
Table 5
1998/99 Reconstrucao GDP Impact 
($000 at 1991 prices)
A. Additional Rural GDP Related To Reconstrucao
1. Sector Familial1 Provisioning Sold Total
(Programme Households)
■ Food (including animals, fish) 2
■ Non-Food Crops (including
Forest Products) 3
■ Artisanal Products'1
■ Home Farm Construction5
■ Basic Services In Kind5
■ Wages From Infrastructure
Rehabilitation'
185,000
5.000
35.000
55.000
5.000
65.000
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
15.000
25.000
250.00
105.000
50.000
55.000 
5,000
25.000
TOTAL 285,000 205,000 490,000
Per Household ($)a $260 $190 $450
Rural Absolute Poverty Line"1 $470 - $520
2 . Sector Familial10 30,000 2 0 ,0 0 0 50,000
(Other Households)
Wages Other Value Added Total
3. Public Services11 30,0003 1 0 ,0 0 0 40,000
a) Basic Services
b) Infrastructure Rehabilitation
30,000 
( " ) 1 0 ,0 0 0
30.000
1 0 .0 0 0
4. Commerce/Transport11' 13
a) Commerce12
b) Transport13
All Sold 107,500 
60,000 
47,500
5. Multiplier Effect15 Not Estimated 
TOTAL Reconstrucao Augmentation
To Rural GDP16 687,500 
Of Which Household Self Provisioning (315,000)
B. Additional Urban GDP Related To Reconstrucao
Provisioning Sold Total
1. Enterprise Added In Sales To : 11 — 175,000 175,000
■ Rural Sector Familial
■ Commerce/Transport
■ Micro-Small Industry
■ Urban Sector Familial
■ Public Service Wage Earners
■ Exports
-
(90.000)
(4 0 .0 0 0)
(15.000)
(7.500)
(7.500)
(15.000)
(90.000)
(40.000)
(15.000)
(7.500)
(7.500)
(15.000)
2 . Urban Sector Familial ("Informal") 2 ,0 0 0 1 2 ,0 0 0 14,000
Agriculture (Zonas Verdes) 13 
Artisanal
(1 ,0 0 0)
(1 ,0 0 0)
(7.000)
(5.000)
(8 ,0 0 0)
(6 ,0 0 0 )
3 . Public Services 1,500 13,500 15,000
■ Basic Services
■ Infrastructure
(1,500)19 
( - )
(7,500)
(6 ,0 0 0)
(4.000)
(6 .0 0 0 )
4 . TOTAL Direct Impact 3,500 201,500 205,000
5. Multiplier (25%)2° - 50,000 50,000
TOTAL - Urban GDP Increase
Related To Reconstrucao21 3, 500_____ 251, 500_____ 255, 000
TOTAL - GDP Increase
Related To Reconstrucao3®' 21' 22 318,500 624,000 942,500
Notes:
1. Production for sale and household self-provisioning by the 1,100,000 households 
included in programme. Gross. Some households have low levels of present output not
transferable on relocation. However, as this affects only 425,000 deslocado households
and their production is (as valued) perhaps $100 per household the difference is under
10%. All items valued at value added level.
2. Estimate 2,750,000 tonnes grain equivalent food of which 2,000,000 consumed by
producers and 750,000 tonnes sold. Value at $100/tonne farmgate less $9.33/tonne 
purchased new labour inputs ($25,000,000 total purchases). Relatively low as grain 
equivalent tonne of vegetables, fruits, livestock, fish fetches substantially more.
(In the other crops cases also weighs substantially more.)
3. Includes both inputs into domestic industry and exports as well as household self­
provisioning (especially in fuel). Probable leading crops cotton, cashew.
4. Furniture, clothing, metal products, etc. Assumed purchased input content $10 million.
5. Assumed 1,100,000 homes lasting five years at value of $250. No estimate of land 
improvements, tree crop stands, additions to livestock herds made.
6 . Largely labour for construction materials, food, furnishings.
7. Labour intensive rural infrastructure rehabilitation as cited in Table 2.
8 . Relates to 1,100,000 households in programme.
9. Rough Estimation/Family of 7:
Urban Rural
Food $500 $225 i->
Housing 100 50 2 0
Transport/Water
Fuel 75 25 a. >
Other Goods/Services 175 220 ’
Total $850____________ $520 (470)
1"’ Farmgate prices plus limited purchases.
2_> Maintenance/Rebuilding Cost Valuation
3‘* Fuel perhaps $2.5 and Water $5 on basis rural prices/User
Fees in kind and cash. Commuter transport urban phenomenon. 
4‘> Same basket - urban prices plus 25%.
Altered basket relating artisanal to product for household 
use and different tastes.
10. The physical infrastructure and commercial network rehabilitation plus immediate (e.g. 
time saved) benefits of basic services rehabilitation will enable output/income 
increases in other sector familial households as will enhanced provision of 
agricultural extension services. Roughly estimated as equal to 10% of programme 
households' gains. On 30,000 present households that is $170 per household.
11. Rough estimates based on Sector Familial sales/purchases. Value added basis.
12. 10% sales plus 15% purchases.
13. 10% sales plus 10% purchases.
14. Sales (Market Prices - including inputs plus value added)
Food/Other Crops 204.5 million
Artisanal Products 19.5 "
224.)
Purchases
Sales 224 million
Infrastructure Wages 25
249
15. Presumably some multiplier can be expected. However, because basic rural purchases 
from the rural sector familial are relatively low (perhaps $35 to $40 million) the 
multiplier effect would be very low. Would tend to be partial offset of overestimation 
cited in Note 1.
16. Rural GDP will also rise from non-Reconstrucao Cotton Authority, Cashew Authority, 
Commercial Farmer and provision of competent training/extension to Irrigation schemes. 
This could amount to $20 to $25 million on food crops and $25 to $50 Million on non­
food crops at value added level and $50 to $87| million at sales level. If 1,500,000 
rural households in 1998/9 that is $30 to $50 per household.
17. Assumptions:
a. Additional gross sales to rural sector equal additional sector familial purchases 
plus Commerce/Transport value added, less $40 million rural-rural.
b. Sales to Micro-Small Industry equal wages plus one half other sectoral value added. 
Sales to commercialised Zonas Verdes and to the artisanalsector = value added. 
(Wages = 25,000 X $600 = $15,000,000; Artisanal Value Added 10,000 X $500 = 
$5,000,000; Zonas Verdes commercialised Value Added $7,000,000; Other Value added 
$2 0,0 0 0,000.)
c. Sales to public service wage earners equal wages ($12,500,000).
d. Rural sales reduced by 33x/a% for transport/rural commerce content; urban by 5% for 
inputs into urban transport/commerce.
e. Value added estimated at 65% of (a + b) reduced by c. Allows 20% operating and 
spares imports, 2|% purchases from rural sector, 1 2|% taxes (actual collection of 
turnover taxes licenses not nominal amount due).
f. Guesstimate of $25 million exports (fob) at 60% value added. The GDP here is value 
added in all urban sectors including commerce, transport and other 
enterprise/household produced services.
18. Assumes small urban infrastructure (e.g. drainage, small scale irrigation, roads, 
canisa site and service plot preparation, latrines) and time saving from closer water 
and health services empowers increase of 1 0 ,0 0 0 tonnes self-provisioning food 
($100/tonne) and 25,000 tonnes commercialised food ($200/tonne) plus $2 million fuel, 
building materials, other non-food crops.
19. User contribution in labour, food, materials to service cost. (Cash payments assumed 
to be $6 million.)
20. This is a relatively low estimate because first round on wage incomes has already been 
taken into account.
21. Does not include large enterprise, Urban Rehabilitation and other Heavy Infrastructure 
(e.g. Railways and Ports) projects not within Reconstrucao.
22. Not directly comparable to present GDP estimates. These seriously underestimate 
current price GDP by using massively too low domestic price levels and inflation rates 
and very incomplete coverage of co-op, informal and private enterprise commercial 
agriculture and of small scale and artisanal urban production of goods and services 
which are only partly offset by massive overestimation of households self-provisioning 
(subsistence) agricultural output.
Table 6
Reconstrucao Fiscal Impact 1998/99
($ 000 Semi 1991 prices) 1
A. Revenue
Urban Rural Total
Additional Tax Revenue
(20% Additional Commercialised GDP ) 2 50,500 74,500 125,000
Cash Contributions To Basic
Service Costs 6 ,0 0 0 12,500 18,500
TOTAL 56,000 87,000 143,000
B. Expenditure
Basic Services3
Wages 1 0 ,0 0 0 30,000 40,000
Other 1 0 ,0 0 0 30,000 40,000
Small Scale Infrastructure'1
Wages 5,000 25,000 30,000
Other 7, 500 37,500 45,000
Interim Food Security51 7,500 - 7, 500
Continued Artisanal/Small Ent­
erprise Enabling6 7, 500 7,500 15,000
Gross Additional Expenditure 47,500 130,000 177,500
Less:
User Contribution In
Goods/Labour1 1,500 5,000 6,500
Reduction Military Expenditure3 ' 9 [12,500] [37,500] 50,000
Total Offsets 14,000 42,500 56,500
Net Additional Expenditure 33,500 87,500 106,000
C. Net Fiscal Gain (Cost) 23,000 (500) 22,500
Notes:
1. 1991 Prices except assumes real minimum salario moves to $40 minimum efficiency level.
2. Shorthand estimate roughly comparable to other serious tax effort primarily agrarian 
Sub-Saharan African economies, e.g. Tanzania. By definition excludes Household Self- 
Provisioning from tax base.
3. Assumes continued build-up beyond 1997/98 levels.
4. Assumes continued run-down from 1995/96 peak levels as rehabilitation backlog reduced.
5. Continued run-down as real minimum wage recovery reduces numbers covered.
6 . Training and Services - Loan Funds assumed by 1998/99 to have become largely revolving 
with additional investment in them on subsequent Developmento capital account.
7. See Table 5.
8 . Urban (25%), Rural (75%) arbitrary - based on projected 1998/99 population division.
9. See Table 4 - Note 5.
Table 7
Reconstrucao GDP External Balance1 Impact 1988/89
(000 $)
Exports
Rural2
Urban3
TOTAL Additional Exports
Imports
Urban Goods Inputs'1 
Rural Goods Inputs5 
Transport®
Government Services7 
Gross Additional Imports
Less:
Reduction Military 
Imports3 
NET Additional Imports 
NET Balance Improvement
Notes:
1. Excludes grant, loan items. Specifically excludes reductions in food 
aid which affects Import/Export sides equally. (See Table 9.)
2. $96,250,000 farmgate plus $19,250,000 (20%) transport/commerce to fob.
3. See Table 5 - Note 17.
4. 20% of Gross Sales. (See Table 5 - Note 17.)
5. Included in Urban Goods Sales.
6 . Rough estimate fuel, spares, replacement lorries.
7. 75% Non Wage spending on Basic Services, Small Scale Infrastructure 
from Table 6 . Dominated by drugs and other medical supplies and 
paper/textbooks.
8 . Rough implicit assumption is that net military savings include $25,000
on items other than wages/rations/local purchases. Gross savings on 
the domestic purchases rations and wages items from Demobilascao should 
be of the order of $30,000 but net will be substantially lower because
of improved pay/rations/uniforms needed to achieve professionalism in
20,000 to 25,000 professional army post Demobilascao.
115.500 
25,000
140.500
55.000 
NA
50.000 
50,500
155,500
25,000 
135,000 
+ 5,000
Table 8
Food (im) Balance - Reconstrucao Impact
(00 0 tonnes grain equivalent)
1990/91 1998/99
Population In Mozambique1 12,500,000 18,250,000
Food Requirement2 4,500,000 (100%) 6,570,000 (100%)
Domestic Production3 2,750,000 (61%) 5,710,000 (87%)
Urban (Zonas Verdes) (150,000) (3%) (185,000) (1%)
Household Consumed 
Commercialised 
Rural
(50,000)
(1 0 0,0 0 0)
(2,600,000)
(1%)
(2%)
(57%)
(60,000) (-) 
(125,000) (1%) 
(5,525,000) (84%)
Household Consumed 
Commercialised4 
Imports5
(2 ,2 0 0,0 0 0)
(400,000)
625,00
(48%)
(9%)
(14%)
(4.400.000) (73%)
(1.225.000) (11%) 
400,000 (6%)
Food Aid
Commercial/Parallel
(500.000)
(125.000)
(11%)
(2%)
(200.000) (3%)
(200.000) (3%)
Food Deficit 1,125,000 (25%) 460,000 (7%)
Urban/Rural Breakdown5 Urban Rural Urban Rural
Population In
Mozambique 3,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 9,500,000 4,500,000 13,750,000
Food Requirement5 1,080,000 3,420,000 1,620,000 4,950,000
Domestic Production 
Urban 
Rural
500,000
(150.000)
(350.000)
2,250,000
( - ) 
(2,250,000)
1,085,000
(185.000)
(900.000)
4,625,000
( - ) 
(4,625,000)
Household Consumed (50,000) (2 ,2 0 0,0 0 0) (60,000) (4,300,000)
Commercialised
Imports5
(450,000)
400,000
(50,000)
225,000
(1,025,000)
375,000
(325,000)
25,000
Food Deficit3 ' 7 180,000
(17%)
945,000
(27%)
160,000
(10%)
300,000
(6%)
Notes:
1. The official United Nations/Government of Mozambique projection of 16,000,000 
is clearly wrong. Subtractions include 1,500,000 refugees and 1,000,000 excess 
deaths resulting from war. Preliminary data in 1991 suggested a total 
population of 12,500,000. 1988/89 assumes return of 1,500,000 refugees plus a 
30% increase on the base population of 14,000,000, or about 3% a year.
2. Production level required assumed to be 360 kilos grain equivalent per year 
based on 800 grammes per day consumption requirement adjusted to allow for 2 0% 
loss from harvest (or import) to consumption.
3. This figure is not a complete estimate. Additions resulting from programmes by
government and enterprises outside Reconstrucao (e.g. competent training and
extension in both large and small scale irrigation areas, commercial farm food 
output expansion) are not included. These could amount to perhaps 200,000 to
250,000 tonnes reducing the deficit by half to 3% to 4% of total requirement. 
That does not mean only 3% to 4% of households (7% on Table 8 figures) have
less than fully adequate food supplies because of inequality in distribution.
However, it should more than halve severe malnutrition from over 20% to 8% to 
10%.
4. Estimates include all marketed output-local trade, private, co-op not only 
officially recorded flows.
5. 1990/91 may understate commercial imports via informal (legal apart from
customs/turnover tax evasion) imports from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi.
6 . Assumes Urban population 4,500,000 in 1988/89 and Rural 13,750,000. Implicit 
urban population growth rate 7%.
7. 1990/91 deficit levels are plausible given known malnutrition data. 1989/90 
estimate of slightly poorer urban than rural nutrition are not implausible;
e.g. they probably parallel actual Tanzanian reality. They parallel estimates 
in Table 9 suggesting slightly higher proportions of absolute poverty (not 
numbers of absolutely poor people) in urban than in rural areas. Again this 
appears congruent with the present situation in Tanzania because while average 
urban household income is higher so too is inequality in food consumption and 
income. However, both differences are clearly within the margins of error of 
the projections.
Table 9
Absolute Poverty Reduction From Reconatrucao
Category1 1990/91 1998/99
Urban2 50% 27|%
■ Related To Low Wages1 (20%) (5%)
■ Related To Low Labour 
Power of Household
plus Unemployment'1 (30%) (22|%)
Rural 71% 22|%
■ Of Livelihood Rehab- 
iliation Programme
Households5 (90%) (25%)
■ Of Other Households 1^ (30%) (20%)
TOTAL7 65% 24%
Notes:
1. See Table 5 - Note 9 for Absolute Poverty Line Estimates.
2. The percentages are of total urban absolutely poor households not of 
sub-population groups absolute poverty percentages.
3. Reduction from raising minimum real salario to $40 (at or approaching 
minimum efficiency level).
4. Reduction from retraining; higher productivity employment in "informal" 
as well as recorded sector; higher productivity employment artisanal, 
Zonas Verdes producers plus reduction in open unemployment (about 4% of 
potentially economically active persons in 1991).
5. See Table 5 - Section A and Note 9. Average income is perhaps 10% 
below absolute poverty line. This implies 20% to 30% of households 
would be below it depending on household income inequality.
6. Benefits from spin-off GDP impact noted in Table 5 - Section B and Note 
10. Likely to be reduced further by rural output increases not related 
to Reconstrucao.
7. Because of parallel non-Reconstrucao generated economic recovery - both 
urban and rural - the actual 1989/90 absolute poverty outcome should be 
marginally to modestly better than these projections.
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